Conflict Analysis and Resolution Information Services

In previous weeks we have looked at ISIS in their core area of Syria-Iraq and their provinces and allied groups elsewhere. This week we address the group in terms of what it calls the ‘far abroad’ where they seek to ‘attack and polarise’. At the time of writing this is an area outside of the Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) where ISIS can exert influence and either recruit volunteers or instigate terrorist attacks.

The purpose of this is to cause fear and destabilise the population and terrorist attacks in North America and Western have a higher correspondence than the much larger number of attacks that occur in the MENA region. Many of the attacks so far have been undertaken by discontented men from the countries themselves and have required little involvement from ISIS other then the motivational media that they put out regularly. As the attacks in Nice and Berlin have demonstrated, the weapon of choice can be something as ordinary as a lorry, but still cause a significant amount of destruction and deaths. There have also been attacks carried out by experienced volunteers, such as those in Brussels on the 22^nd March 2016 and in France between the 13^th and 14^th November 2015.  Other attacks have been carried out with firearms and knives.

Attacks by individuals radicalised by ISIS propaganda are a major concern for counter-terrorism as while people entering the country from abroad can be effectively tracked, ‘lone wolves’ are harder to identify. They may not have been involved in criminal activities before, or have a record of petty crime, but little, except for a change in behaviour, noticeable only by friends and family, to indicate their intentions. Where there are commonalities, these relate to feelings of isolation, discrimination and lack of opportunity for achievement or recognition. Given that the majority of the population may at some time feel this way, and not be motivated to violence, a ‘lone wolf’ is unlikely to stand out. One constant is that those radicalised by ISIS and willing to use violence remain in the minority, but one which can do immense harm.

An additional concern is the ‘returning fighters’, who have served with ISIS in Syria and Iraq. As ISIS continues to suffer major reversals in fortune and loss of territory they will switch to a higher utilisation of terrorism as a strategy, both in the ‘interior ring’ of Syria and Iraq’, and the ‘far abroad ring’. These are the hardliners, with battle experience, who are capable of organising single or coordinated attacks and causing significant numbers of casualties. With these, it is a question of the police and security services succeeding in doing their work of monitoring, gathering intelligence and arresting people seeking to do harm. There is also the valuable, softer, approach of de-radicalisation, which can be done at community or national levels.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/virtual-caliphate-isiss-information-warfare

http://uk.businessinsider.com/map-isis-europe-attacks-fighters-2015-12?r=US&IR=T

http://icsr.info/2017/02/icsr-report-media-jihad-islamic-states-doctrine-information-warfare/

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39176110

Dr Carl Turner,

Site Coordinator

The previous three weeks have all, for differing reasons, involved ISIS. We have looked at the advance towards the Syrian city of Raqqa, the battle for the Iraqi city of Mosul, and the aftermath of the battle for Sirte in Libya.

ISIS can be understood as having three distinct aspects, with differing strengths and weaknesses, and so differing strategies. The first is the self-declared Islamic State caliphate, which takes in contiguous territory from Iraq and Syria with its capital at Raqqa. This is the core base, where ISIS holds and administers territory and is critical to ISIS’s claim to be a worldwide caliphate, one which claims authority over all Muslims. This has been rejected outright by governments and Muslim leaders worldwide. The second is the establishment of provinces, or wilayah’s, elsewhere and the acceptance of allegiances from other radical Islamist groups, thus allowing ISIS to spread their influence. The third is the far abroad, non-Muslim territories, where ISIS seeks to carry out terrorist attacks and polarise opinion. This has occurred mostly in Western Europe, either by existing ISIS members or people radicalized by ISIS ideology.

This week our focus is on the provinces and affiliates and we will look at what ISIS calls ‘the far abroad’ next week. The key difference between a province and an affiliate is in organisation: a province must have a unified leadership, accept ISIS’s version of Sharia law and have a plan to consolidate territory. Affiliated groups act independently and claim attacks on behalf of ISIS. As of May 2016 ISIS had formally recognised 35 provinces in nine countries, with a geographical reach across North Africa, the Middle-East, South Asia and South-East Asia, and covering the majority of the Muslim world. Some countries have more than one province: for example, there are nine in Syria, eight in Yemen, and three in Saudi Arabia. This is because a province is an area of control with a larger territorial region.

The provinces have not been as successful as the ISIS leadership have intended and they are becoming more important as ISIS loses territory in Syria and Iraq. There are only three provinces external to these countries that actually control territory, and these are in Libya, Egypt (the Sinai) and straddling Afghanistan and Pakistan (known as the Khorasan province). All three of these are struggling to survive as territories, although they are causing significant numbers of casualties and have had a major impact on the local populations. The most significant province is that in West Africa, after Boko Haram declared allegiance to ISIS in 2015, although it is difficult to ascertain how strong the relationship is between them. The group has suffered major reversals in fortune and a leadership split in 2016 puts their loyalty to ISIS in question. Other provinces in Algeria, the North Caucasus, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have failed to make any territorial gains. Generally, provinces and affiliates have been added when local radical Islamist groups declare themselves for ISIS. The affiliates, groups that have declared allegiance to ISIS, currently have little territorial control and include groups in Bangladesh, India, the Philippines and Somalia.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://apps.frontline.org/isis-affiliates/

https://www.indy100.com/article/all-the-groups-worldwide-that-have-pledged-their-allegiance-to-isis–WyppUO47Kg

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/03/isis-and-affiliates-around-the-world

Dr Carl Turner,

Site Coordinator

Our blogs for the previous two weeks were concerned with the ongoing offensives aimed at the ISIS strongholds of Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq, which have attracted much media attention due to their scale and the complex alliances involved. These are major conflict situations, which will continue to evolve and produce consequences over coming months and years. This week, we look at the outcome of the defeat of ISIS in their stronghold of Sirte in Libya.

Sirte has a unique place in the recent history of Libya, as a battle for the city led to the capture and killing of Muammar Gaddafi and the end of the armed uprising that took place in 2011. This began with protests in Benghazi, which were violently put down, and spread across Libyan cities, resulting in a major armed conflict between loyalists and rebels. Fears of major human rights violations as government forces approached the rebel stronghold of Benghazi resulted in the imposition of a no-fly zone by the UN, enforced by NATO, and an eventual rebel victory. Political division in Libya led to the outbreak of a civil war in 2014, and this has evolved into a conflict between four major alliances. Libya’s transition from authoritarian state to a failed state makes the country a casualty of the Arab Spring, a major regional change with varied results, and has brought into question the merits of armed intervention and post-conflict planning. ISIS has attempted to establish provinces within Libya, including that at Sirte, where Salafist Islamic militants controlling the city declared allegiance to ISIS in October 2014 after the despatch of an ISIS delegation.

A major offensive to capture Sirte was launched by the Government of National Accord (GNA) on the 12^th May 2016, backed by US airpower and US and UK Special Forces. The battle for the city itself ended on the 6^th December but fighting continues in the surrounding area. The consequences for the civilian population have been severe: the city has been mostly destroyed, as it has been the location of major battles in 2011 and 2016, and since June 2015 some 19,000 families fled Sirte and are scattered across Libya. For returning citizens, there is the threat of unexploded munitions and a crippled infrastructure. Nor has the risk of violence gone: ISIS has been forced from the city, but a security presence and working government is required to provide stability to prevent its return and the risk of sleeper cells emerging is a real one. Moreover, the civil war is far from over, and the area around Sirte is a major oil producing region, making it a valuable asset. The redevelopment of the city depends upon security and stability as reconstruction efforts after the 2011 battle were undone by the more destructive 2016 battle.

For more on the outcome of the battle for Sirte:

https://twitter.com/search?q=%23sirte&src=typd&lang=en

http://reliefweb.int/report/libya/libyans-twice-uprooted-war-call-urgent-help

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/after-the-islamic-state-in-libya-all-out-war

http://www.africanews.com/2016/12/18/libya-officially-declares-sirte-free-from-islamic-state//

Dr Carl Turner,

Site Coordinator

Last week we focused on the Turkish incursion into Syria and this week we will focusing on the battle for the ISIS stronghold of Mosul in Northern Iraq, which was seized by ISIS in June 2014.

The combined offensive to retake Mosul began on 16^th October 2016 and has involved a plethora of actors, with differing perspectives but a common cause. At the time of writing, the eastern part of Mosul is held by the Iraqi army.  The fighting on the ground is being undertaken by the Iraqi armed forces, Kurdish peshmerga fighters and the People’s Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF are coalition of mostly Shia militias, but also includes a small number of Christians, Yazidi’s and Sunni Muslims. These are supported by the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTO-OIR), who are providing air support. Turkish trained Turkmen are also involved, despite protests from the Iraqi government. This complex alliance, involving the three major population groups of Iraq; the Sunnis, Shia, and Kurds, with minority groups, has maintained its cohesion as coordinated fighting force.

The battle has been a painstaking one, with ISIL offering a substantial and committed resistance. Since the operation to take the city began, there has been a major humanitarian operation to handle the displaced population of Mosul, with refugees being encouraged to head towards Irbil, where refugee camps have been set up. In October of last year, some refugees had headed into Syria’s Rojave region.

The battle for Mosul is likely to cause irreparable damage to the city and its surrounding area, much as was the case with Ramadi, where up to 80% of the city’s infrastructure was described and the bill for reconstruction put at a minimum of one billion US dollars.

Next week this blog will move to being posted on a Saturday, and will look at the third of three concurrent battles to take an ISIS stronghold: the battle for Sirte in Libya.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/01/battle-mosul-upends-false-iraq-narrative-170130050458800.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/world/middleeast/isis-battle-for-mosul.html?_r=0

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/04/battle-for-mosul-maps-visual-guide-fighting-iraq-isis

http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/15151/19/Post-Ramadi-test-for-Iraq.aspx

Dr Carl Turner,

Site Coordinator

Previously, the battle for Mosul has received mention, and this week’s blog is focused on one aspect of the battle to take the city of Raqqa from ISIS, their de facto capital. Turkey’s incursion into Syria began when Operation ‘Euphrates Shield’ was launched on the 24^th July 2016.

The conflict in Syria has been described as complex, although this barely covers what can be described as a regional conflict complex centred on Syria, but impacting on the countries bordering it. In northern Syria, a panoply of regional forces; Turkmen, Chechen and Kurdish, amongst others, have carved out territory during the ongoing Syrian civil war. An example of this is the battle for Kobani between ISIS and the Kurdish Peoples Protection Units (YPG). Turkey has given three reasons for its involvement in Syria: to secure Turkey’s borders, confront ISIS, and to prevent the YPG and PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) from creating an autonomous Kurdish region on Turkey’s border. Turkey’s internal conflict with the separatist PKK has undergone an explosive re-escalation, and while this has causes unique to Turkey, the crisis in Syria was a factor. Initially, Operation Euphrates Shield brought Turkey’s military into conflict with the YPG, although the two US allies have since refrained from major fighting between each other.

In a further development, Russia and Turkey have been cooperating with each other against ISIS, and this has drawn media attention recently when Russian aircraft accidentally bombed Turkish troops. The battle against ISIS north of their Raqqa stronghold has drawn in Kurds, Turkmen and others into a temporary alliance as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in turn working with other alliances in the region. These are backed by British, French, Jordanian and US airpower. Should the fragile alliance between Russia, Turkey and the SDF hold while they combat ISIS, it is unlikely that this will survive in the event that ISIS is defeated. While the militaries focus on their strategies against ISIS, the conflict analysis and resolution community would do well to consider how to maintain the peace in the wake of military victory.

Turkey’s involvement in Syria is unique, as they are the only NATO member to use their army on the ground. While others have provided Special Forces, Turkey has deployed its army in force. In time, the question may be as to how they can be withdrawn.

For more on this, see:

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/dozens-isil-fighters-killed-turkish-led-forces-170209053641820.html

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/02/operation-euphrates-shield-progress-scope-170201133525121.html

http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1154768299&Country=Syria&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=Political+stability&u=1&pid=874884671&oid=874884671&uid=1

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/syria-euphrates-shield.htm

https://twitter.com/search?q=%23Raqqa&src=tyah&lang=en

Dr Carl Turner,

Site Coordinator

The conflict between the Ukraine’s armed forces and Russian backed separatists of the Donetsk Peoples Republic in the Donbass region began in 2014 and the most recent ceasefire has been in place since the 24^th December 2016. There have numerous ceasefire violations recorded by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), but these have spiked since the 29^th January 2017 near Avdiivka and both sides blame the other for the escalation.

While military casualties have been reported, the largest impact is on the industrial town’s population, with 17,000 residents left without water and electricity, and an impending refugee crisis as a potential evacuation looms. The use of heavy weapons, including Grad rockets, is in violation of the ceasefire agreement.

Russia’s Vladimir Putin has denied any Russian support for the separatist cause, which erupted after the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, yet the resources available to the separatist cause, the rapid annexation of Crimea, and returning Russian casualties point firmly towards a campaign of hybrid warfare aimed at destabilising Ukraine, which in 2014 was leaning towards seeking membership of the EU and NATO. The actual underlying causes of the 2014 revolution were related to governmental corruption, and division over the future political path of Ukraine, a country with a clear demographic boundary between a pro-EU West and a pro-Russian Eastern region. The reasons for this escalating into armed conflict remain in dispute, although it is undeniable that the Russian government did not want to see Ukraine added to a plethora of countries that have joined the EU and/or NATO, and the expansion of both organisations has taken them to Russia’s borders. It is not the first time that a former Soviet Republic with aspirations to join NATO has seen an intervention by Russia, a notable example being Georgia, where internal tensions between Russophile regions (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and the Georgian government led to a Russian military intervention. Events in Georgia and Ukraine demonstrate the danger inherent in EU and NATO expansion into Russian spheres of influence and countries with significant Russian minorities.

We cannot really know if the accession of Ukraine to the EU or NATO would have proved feasible in the long term, but neither was guaranteed and the political situation and demographics of Ukraine may have rendered accession unfeasible. What we can be sure of, amid claim and counterclaim of blame, is that it is Ukraine that is suffering as a wider geopolitical confrontation plays out, and it is civilians of the Donbass region who have suffered the worst consequences of a costly war with military casualties from both the Ukrainian and DPR fighting forces.

It remains to be seen if the battle for Avdiivka is a temporary major escalation of the conflict or part of a wider strategy to expand the territory of the Donetsk Peoples Republic. Of the external actors with influence on events, the EU is distracted by internal problems and upcoming elections and the US appears to be heading into its own crisis, while Russia appears to have a free hand.

For more on the Ukraine Crisis see:

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/ENACARegion/Pages/UAIndex.aspx

https://twitter.com/search?q=%23Ukraine&src=tyah&lang=en

http://www.conflict-news.com/articles/winter-assault-on-avdiivka-fits-ongoing-russian-strategy-in-donbass-invasion

Dr Carl Turner,

Site Coordinator

The Rohingya people are a Muslim people who live in the Rakhine State of Myanmar (formally Burma). In Rakhine the number of Rohingya is approximately one million out of a population of over three million, making them a minority group amongst a Buddhist population both in Rakhine State and Myanmar. There has been an on-off insurgency by Rohingyan insurgents since 1947, initially wanted secession from Burma and annexation by East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Since 1972 Islamist movements have dominated the insurgency.

The Rohingya have long been seen as Bangladeshi immigrants by successive Myanmar governments. In 1982 they were stripped of their citizenship and effectively barred from voting in the 2015 general elections. There are severe movement restrictions on the Rohingya, affecting access to education, healthcare and employment. Political violence in 2012 left over 120,000 Rohingya internally displaced in squalid camps and refugees have fled to Bangladesh since 1978 and more recently to Thailand.

The current crisis was triggered by a lethal assault on three border guard posts on the 9^th October 2016 by insurgents. This has led to a military crackdown that has seen villages burned to the ground, and numerous testimonies of beatings, murder and rape. Humanitarian activities have been shut down. The UN human rights office has said that the crackdown could amount to crimes against humanity. Myanmar’s neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia, have heavily criticised the situation in Rakhine state. The Myanmar government denies any wrongdoing.

For more on the Rohingya Crisis see:

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/10/rohingya-151024202611276.html

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-38168917

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/rohingya_en.pdf

https://twitter.com/search?q=%23rohingya&src=tyah&lang=en

Dr Carl Turner,

Site Coordinator

This week, much media attention has been given to the inauguration of Donald Trump as the 45^th President of the United States, and rightly so as the USA has a major influence in global affairs. The incoming President has pursued a hard line on domestic and international affairs during his campaign and it remains to be seen if he can pursue his policies or will be tempered by the realities of presidential office and opposition from mainstream republicans within his own party.

Yesterday saw the inauguration of Adama Barrow as the President of The Gambia, an event that took place in neighbouring Senegal as the incumbent President of 22 years, Yahya Jammeh, has refused to cede power after losing an election on the 1^st December 2016. The crisis has reached a head as the regional organisation ECOWAS has authorised West African troops to enter The Gambia. These troops have halted their advance while the Presidents of Guinea and Mauritania engage in last minute talks to persuade President Jammeh to step down. The Gambian Army has stated that it will not oppose the invasion, which led to an exodus of tourists and has turned the capital into a ghost town. It is unlikely that there will be any significant resistance to the entry of ECOWAS troops due to their superiority in numbers and resources, although there is potential for a minor incident to act as a flashpoint. The Gambia crisis will provide lessons for international intervention to support the outcome of democratic elections. It is hoped that these will prove to be positive.

As Nigeria deploys jets over The Gambia it is dealing with the consequences of an airstrike by one of its aircraft on a refugee camp in Rann, located in north-eastern Nigeria. The bombing, which has killed upward of 70 people, including staff from aid agencies, has been attributed by the Nigerian military to the ‘fog of war’, has been condemned by the Human Rights Watch and aid agencies. It is the first time that a targeting error has been admitted in a region where the Nigerian military is battling the ISIS affiliated Boko Harem insurgency. While airpower can be a powerful resource for militaries battling insurgencies, it can also be a notoriously blunt instrument despite much vaunted targeting capabilities.

In Iraq, the painstaking operation by the Iraqi Army to retake Mosul from ISIS has borne fruit with the declaration that the Iraqi Army now holds all of the eastern part of the city. ISIS has resisted the advance since October of 2016, despite facing the Iraqi Army, Kurdish Peshmerga, Sunni Arab tribesmen, and Shia militias, with support from coalition airpower. That Mosul will be taken is not in doubt, the question is as to how long it will take and how much damage the city will suffer as a consequence. There is also the question of returning citizens to what had been an ethnically and religiously diverse city, which has spent two years under ISIS’s hard-line rule, one which recognised only the Sunni interpretation of Islam as legitimate. The battle across Iraq against ISIS has required the major groups of Sunni’s, Shia and Kurd’s to cooperate but Iraq’s future depends on further cooperation in the long term when ISIS has been forced from Iraq.

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator.

CARIS is the Conflict Analysis and Resolution Information Services website. The purpose of CARIS is the promotion of education and research for people who wish to understand armed conflict in the world today and how it can be brought to an end. CARIS is intended both for anyone who wishes to learn about conflict analysis and resolution and the more experienced researcher who wishes to explore new ideas. The website has no political or ideological affiliation outside of the goal of conflict resolution and acts as independent resource centre. It is also a gateway to the wider community of conflict analysis and resolution.

The aims of CARIS are:

1. The promotion of the understanding and resolution of armed conflict.
2. The provision of open access information and resources to all for the understanding of conflict analysis and resolution and the ending of terrorism and insurgency.
3. The hosting of dedicated research centres and documents with the purpose of producing original research and publications.

What CARIS can do for you.

We see and hear about armed conflict in the news every day and many people are unfortunate enough to be caught up in one. It can seem that armed conflict is endemic and never ending. In fact, the majority of conflicts do end and conflict analysis and resolution helps us understand why and points towards how ongoing armed conflicts can be ended.

CARIS provides three services towards this goal:

Conflict Analysis and Resolution: An open source information centre on Conflict Analysis and Resolution (CAR) aimed at promoting education and knowledge of the subject area. This is intended for non-specialist who wants to learn about armed conflict, how it is studied, and most important of all, how it can be resolved. The information centre also hosts a resources page with links to sites and organisations with aims similar to those of CARIS.

Research Centres: Open access hosting of collaborative research areas to generate networks and resources for the study of topics related to the aims of the CARIS. This is intended for researchers who want to initiate a research program or expand an existing one.

Documents: Open access hosting of documents related to the aims of CARIS. These include working papers intended for publication in journals, briefings and reports.

If you are interested in learning about conflict analysis and resolution then please visit the website and use the resources, for which there is no fee. If you are interested in setting up a research centre or want to submit documents for inclusion please contact the site coordinator at:

www.turnerconflict.com

Thank you,

Carl Turner,

Site Coordinator.