Conflict Analysis and Resolution Information Services

Generally this blog has focused on four distinct subjects: The Rohingya Crisis, the Ukraine conflict, the Syrian war, and ISIS. These are varied and important subjects. The plight of the Rohingya has been described as ethnic cleansing and forced migration, and is at the very least oppression and a gross violation of human rights. Ukraine’s descent into civil war was avoidable and its origins relate to domestic and international concerns over Ukraine’s place in Europe, stoked by Russian concerns over NATO and EU expansion. The Syrian war is a research interest of the author, and so features regularly, as the search for a resolution to the most complicated conflict of modern times continues. Research on the Syrian war naturally includes ISIS, whose establishment of a self-declared Caliphate across Syria and Iraq, and its impact on the Middle-East, makes it a subject of interest across the world.

These are all worthy interests, which actually deserve more attention. However, this comes at the expense of neglecting other armed conflicts also worthy of attention. The first stated aim of the CARIS website is the understanding and resolution of armed conflict and this is a general aim. With this in mind the focus of this blog will move to other conflict situations, moving from Syria, and across Africa, where international borders are also insubstantial in the face of armed conflicts that transcend them. The first step does not take us far, in fact only to the closest point of the Arabian Peninsula to Africa, where a war rages for the control of Yemen.

North and South Yemen unified as Yemen in 1990 but the political tensions led to the Northern and Southern armies, which had not integrated, engaging in a brief civil war in 1994 won by Northern forces. A low-level insurgency by Shia Houthi rebels against the Yemeni government began in 2004 and continued on up to the 2011 Yemeni revolution.  Part of the ‘Arab Spring’, the revolution was driven by discontent over unemployment, corruption and a proposed amendment to the constitution to allow succession by the President’s son. This led to President Saleh’s resignation in favour of his deputy, Vice-President Hadi, and the formation of a unity government. Since then the government has faced challenges from Houthis, southern separatists opposed to the Yemeni unification, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and latterly, ISIS. It can be seen that prior to the outbreak of the civil war in 2015 the newly unified country had been subject to severe political differences, a Shia insurgency, and a revolution, leaving a weak central government. The Houthi’s, who form an important part of the current civil war, are Zaidi’s, a Shia sect, and called Ansar Allah, but are generally known as Shia ‘Houthis’. They are supporters of former President Saleh.

Further political disagreement led to a northern battle between Houthis and Sunni tribes becoming one between the Houthis and Southern allies against the incumbent government. The subsequent fighting was severe and resulted in two factions holding territory: The Houthi dominated Supreme Political Council allied to former President Saleh and the Hadi-led government and their allies. Substantial territory is also held by AQAP and there are pockets of ISIS territory. Saudi Arabia has led a coalition against Houthi forces since the 24^th March 2016 in support of the Hadi-led government, including controversial airstrikes. The presence of AQAP and ISIL has meant that the United States has also deployed substantial resources in Yemen. The Houthis have limited support from Iran and Hezbollah. For a military history of the civil war the Wikipedia page is recommended (see below).

The conflict between the Houthis and the Government has been portrayed as a proxy war to the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two most powerful states in the region, who are competing for dominance and are split along Sunni-Shia lines. This is misleading, as the Saudi-led intervention is a powerful coalition directly involved in combat operations, while Iranian support for the Houthis is minimal and they had no wish for the Houthis and their allies to launch the dramatic 2015 offensive. Anti-western rhetoric by the Houthis prior to the civil war and regular secretive flights to Sanaa from Iran has fuelled Saudi claims that Iran is a major supporter of the Houthis. In reality, the civil war began due to internal political discontent in Yemen that dates back decades and support from former President Saleh ensured that an already well armed insurgency had access to government weapons. The most significant intervention in the war is that by the Saudi-led coalition, which has expended billions of dollars helping President Hadi’s government to survive, compared to a much smaller sum invested by Iran, who has outsourced the Houthis to Hezbollah. While this may change in the future, Iran has to do little in order to keep Houthis being a thorn in Saudi Arabia’s side and they have more interest in a stable Yemen than one at war with itself.

The tragedy is in the consequences. With a reported 7,600 deaths and 42,000 injured, mostly since the coalition airstrikes began, over fifty percent of Yemen’s hospitals have been put out of action. The destruction of infrastructure and homes has led to severe malnutrition and a recent outbreak of cholera. While there have been longstanding problems in Yemen due to food shortages and scarcity of water, these have been severely exacerbated by a conflict that has displaced over 2.5 million people. As is the case with most civil wars, the impact on the ability of Yemen to function and provide for its people has been devastating. Next week we will look at attempts at conflict resolution and future prospects.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemeni_Civil_War_(2015%E2%80%93present)#Saudi-led_intervention_in_Yemen

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29319423

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/26/iran-saudi-proxy-war-yemen-crisis

http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/67988

https://tcf.org/content/report/irans-role-yemen-exaggerated-destructive/

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56227#.WWoW5tQrKt9

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

With the impending fall of the self-declared ISIS Caliphate and a reversion to terrorism and insurgency in Iraq and Syria commentators and analysts have returned to the long standing concern of ISIS inspired attacks in what the group terms the ‘far abroad’. In this region, outside of the Muslim lands, they seek to ‘attack and polarise’ by launching brutal attacks that will increase discrimination against Muslims and an increase in attacks on them, motivating the alienated and discontented to join the ISIS cause. This is a formula present in the strategies of terrorist groups and insurgencies throughout history, one that is inherently flawed as it encourages a strong counterterrorist response and governments are increasingly adept at differentiating between a terrorist and the people they claim to represent.

Concerns are generally about three types: the lone attacker, the returning fighter, and a group organised externally. These are not mutually exclusive (the returning fighter may launch a lone attack or form a group for example), nor are they a new threat, as countries in North America, Western Europe and Russia are well aware. Most of the attacks that have taken place, and which have caused serious harm and loss of life, have involved lone attackers, commonly called ‘lone wolves’, acting with little or no actual support and motivated by their own experience and ISIS propaganda. The recent attack near London Bridge in the UK was organised by three people but was still amateurish in its application, as a large number of attacks are.

The prospect of returning fighters and actual external support is an alarming one as they would be more capable of launching a sustained mass casualty attack, although it is far more difficult, but not impossible, for them to enter a country undetected. The problem of returning fighters is not a new one but has become an increasing concern as the loss of territory in Iraq and Syria and the demise in ISIS’s status means a potential temporary increase in volunteers returning home. This increases the chances of one returning home undetected and, if of the right mind, able to work quietly towards building a network or carrying out a well planned and executed attack. Security services across the world have varied capabilities and, more often than not, experience, but as a well worn adage goes: they have to be lucky all the time, the terrorist just once.

This leaves us with the potential threat coming from the lone attackers with little actual connection to ISIS, no direct support, and only the ISIS propaganda machine to guide them. Security services have become increasing capable at spotting plotters and extremists of all types as they inevitably leave a digital footprint and are prone to communicating their views long before they actually reach the point where they have been radicalised enough to carry out an attack. The problem has been with having the resources to monitor all the potential attackers and either identifying when a law has been broken or intervene through de-radicalisation programmes. Prevention is better than prosecution, and prosecution for encouraging or preparing a terrorist attack is better than dealing with the consequences of an attack.

Sadly, there is no guarantee that each and every terrorist attack will be stopped. No responsible counterterrorist expert or government would claim this to be the case, especially in the open societies of liberal-democracies. The Europeans in particular are aware of this and have faced a variety of types of terrorism from the far-right, far-left, ethno-nationalists, amongst others, over the years. Terrorism alert statuses and vigilance remain high because there is a clearly defined threat and people willing to commit terrorist acts in the name of a cause. There is no silver bullet to stop this but the threat can be reduced through constructive prevention strategies, de-radicalisation programmes in the community and prisons, clamping down severely on the preachers of hate, and targeting robustly those who advocate or plan to do harm.

This four part series has focused on ISIS in the context of its impending demise as a proto-state sprawled across Iraq and Syria, projecting its future as an organisation. While clearly weakened ISIS is not done yet. There is still a lot to be done in Iraq and Syria and the group has maintained a presence in other countries by establishing provinces, accepting allegiances, and motivating people in the ‘far abroad’ to carry out attacks that it can claim despite little actual input. ISIS is also but one group amongst many that espouse a jihadist ideology and seek to hold territory or carry out attacks in a complex global conflict environment. Nor is it guaranteed to remain as the preeminent jihadist terror organisation. It is possible that Al-Qaeda may return to prominence as they also have a strong global footprint, or another group may emerge to fly the jihadist flag and espouse an ideology that draws foreign fighters to them.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-32026985

https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/beyond-iraq-and-syria-isis-ability-to-conduct-attacks-abroad/

http://iswresearch.blogspot.co.uk/2017/06/isiss-global-campaign-remains-intact.html

Dr Carl Turner,

Site Coordinator

The battle for the ISIS heartland in Iraq and Syria is far from complete and there is a more than strong chance that its existence as terrorist organisation and insurgency outside of the main cities will be a long one. The claim to a Caliphate, however, may be centered on the Sunni populated area that sprawls either side of the Iraq-Syria border but it is not wholly dependent on it. Akin to its formidable predecessor Al-Qaeda, ISIS is as much an idea as it is a material thing inhabiting a space in the Middle-East. The idea is one of the establishment of a Caliphate based on its extremist understanding of Islam and encompassing all of the Muslim world, regardless of what the rest of a diverse Muslim world and the rest of the peoples in it think of the idea. If this seems totalitarian in nature, then bear in mind that even the Al-Qaeda leadership has balked at what ISIS does and what it wants to be, and they can hardly be described as moderate in their own ideology. For ISIS, the Muslim world is the ‘near abroad’.

ISIS has struggled to maintain territory in this area of the world, a large one encompassing North Africa, the Middle-East, Central Asia, and Southern Asia. Its most viable province had been in Libya when they held the city of Sirte, until it was overrun by one of Libya’s competing factions. A province must have a unified leadership, accept ISIS’s version of Sharia law and have a plan to consolidate territory. There are many more of these struggling provinces, all based within conflict zones where governments struggle against local insurgents, often with Al-Qaeda or a group linked to them also present. An example is the Khorasan Province, which operates from its base in Afghanistan and has sent fighters to Syria. From a small set up of a reported 50 people and local recruitment it became strong enough to warrant the attention of the largest bomb in the US arsenal and, in a familiar pattern, has drawn the ire of the militaries of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the US and also the Taliban.

Then there are the numerous affiliates, who act independently and claim attacks on behalf of ISIS. The most high-profile recent event was the occupation of the Philippine city of Marawi. The extent of ISIS’s involvement is unclear as there already a number of established insurgent groups in the area and in the Philippines, although a local radical-Islamist group, Maute, has pledged itself to the ISIS and there are reports of foreign fighters being involved in the fighting, which is ongoing. This is an example of the ability of ISIS to gain prominence in an already existing conflict situation through the affiliation of a local group and escalate the conflict situation. Through the commitment of a small number of men and the acceptance of an affiliation ISIS has become involved in another battle for a city. One at the easternmost point of the Muslim world and which has over 200,000 inhabitants.

The capabilities and successes of the provinces and affiliated groups are mixed, but they are a presence and they have the potential to make existing conflict situations far worse than they already are. One thing that does stand out is that while ISIS are able to establish themselves as provinces in short order they rapidly come into conflict with almost every other actor in the area, making even radical-Islamist groups such as the Taliban appear moderate in the process. Their ability to maintain the affiliates is dependent on the strength of their brand and the willingness of local groups, usually but not exclusively, smaller actors within an insurgent archipelago to continue to claim allegiance. The larger established groups, Boko Haram and al-Shabab are examples, are able to operate without the ISIS label and can claim their successes as their own if they so wish. The question now is to how much emphasis ISIS will put on the ‘near abroad’ and whether or not another organisation will supplant them as the primary radical-Islamist group. It will not, however, mean the end of ISIS as an organisation.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

https://www.yahoo.com/news/islamic-state-gaining-ground-afghanistan-un-235952988.html

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/islamic-state-details-activity-in-the-philippines.php

http://apps.frontline.org/isis-affiliates/

https://www.indy100.com/article/all-the-groups-worldwide-that-have-pledged-their-allegiance-to-isis–WyppUO47Kg

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/03/isis-and-affiliates-around-the-world

Dr Carl Turner,

Site Coordinator

ISIS in the core ‘Islamic State’ appears to be in a state of terminal decline. Iraqi forces are poised to take the remaining part of Mosul after months of battle, an Arab-Kurdish coalition has entered Raqqa, and in southern Syria, the Syrian Arab Army and its allies have reached the border with Iraq, closing an important ISIS route as they did so. Years of being pummeled from the air by coalition airpower, and latterly Russian air attacks, have brought about the circumstance where ISIS enters the endgame as a proto-state. The cost to infrastructure and civilians has been immense, both from ISIS invasion and rule and the campaigns to defeat them. The battles are not over, nor the ‘war’ won, but the end is in sight.

To be sure, nothing should be taken for granted, the victory is not yet here, and the nature and viability of ISIS in its soon to be former heartland is in the hands of a multitude of actors whose differences have the potential to throw victory away. This is a concern in terms of the future security of people in both Iraq and Syria and in terms of the gross trauma that has been inflicted on them. The former is critical in allowing them to recover and rebuild and the latter an unnecessary human-inflicted tragedy.

In an earlier blog it was argued that ISIS would revert to the tactics of terrorism and insurgency that drove their forces forward in 2014 and that the weakness of Iraq and Syria as cohesive states provided the conditions for a revival of ISIS or the emergence of a similar group in the future. These are a concern as the lack of a territory and military defeat does not make ISIS a lost cause as its ideology incorporates an apocalyptic worldview, which conveniently works during either military victory or defeat. The ideology remains as a seed to be sowed in all weathers and climes and these take root where there is an absence of security and/or the state is weak, much in the way that the crushing of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan has not prevented its re-emergence since. The jihadist ideology thrives in conflict zones.

This brings us to where it can go wrong in a regional environment with multiple actors and interests whose aims and goals are incompatible. There was no alliance between these regarding ISIS, more a convergence of interests that meant they fought ISIS separately at the same time. The battles for the future of Syria are not simply a matter of the people of Syria deciding who rules Syria but more a matter of the interests of competing regional powers within a battle zone that they have transformed into a sectarian battleground. They have been assisted in this by the US led coalition and Russia, who clearly support, respectively, the moderate opposition and the Government. Al-Qaeda linked groups remain, who have proved to be very effective in their battles and still hold territory. How they will fare depends on what the other actors do, and thus far, they have made their own interests a priority over the ending of Syria’s war. Every regional and international power, including the US, France, UK, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Turkey, and Iran, has sought to mediate an end to the war, but with their own terms in mind, while most continue to be active militarily. With no end in sight to this and the lack of security and stability that comes with it, Syria remains vulnerable to a Jihadist revival and at the very least will host jihadist terror groups’, the question is under what banner.

The other problem is that preventing the re-emergence of ISIS, or a successor group, is not simply dependent on military solutions, but the prickly question of representation in society and politics. This was at the heart of the uprising in Syria in 2011 and has proved to be a major problem in post-invasion Iraq, whose security relies on a hodgepodge of the Iraqi security forces, Shia and Sunni militias (Iraqi and Iranian), tribal groups, and Kurdish peshmerga. The war against ISIS is unfinished and Iraq is a divided state along sectarian lines with clear Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish areas. The Shia’s and the Kurd’s have been critical to retaking the predominantly Sunni areas of Iraq from ISIS and are welcome liberators, but the provision of long term security and stability is another matter, and needs to fall to either the Iraqi army or Sunni defence forces, lest liberators come to be seen as occupiers. The question for Iraq is the reintegration of Sunni’s into the social and political sphere in manner where they see their interests as being fairly represented. This is a massive task, while Shia Iran maintains an influence and the Shia are in the majority and the Kurd’s are considering independence, a prospect that will alarm Turkey the most. Yet it must be done, less the Jihadist groups infiltrate again and do their damage even as the villages, towns, and cities of western and northern Iraq are being rebuilt. Winning military battles is one thing, rebuilding a country and dealing with the human cost and damage to infrastructure is another. This is where the resources of the international community will prove invaluable.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/syrian-soldiers-push-isil-reach-iraqi-border-170610070401646.html

http://www.businessinsider.com/isiss-global-strategy-is-coming-into-focus-2015-5?IR=T

https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policy-makers-8th-edition-2017/dealing-isis-iraq-syria

Dr Carl Turner,

Site Coordinator

Today, another mid-week blog due to an attack on the streets of the United Kingdom, one in which a vehicle has been used to mow down people and the driver has emerged shouting for people to die. Bewildered family members and neighbours register their shock and offer their condolences. So far the same, but no knives, no bomb vest, and no inclination to martyrdom. This time the attacker is caught and handed over to the Police bruised but intact. There seems to be a problem with what to term that which has occurred, a word on the lips that has been used before but doesn’t seem right to some, but then it is used anyway, just to be sure, after all, we want to be fair or at least be seen to be fair, right?

And right after the thing that has happened, there’s a word for it that is coming to mind, the usual cries for something to be done, for more security, to send ‘them’ back or deport ‘them’ are muted, except of course for the truly committed or tactless. There’s nothing to fear here. Move on.

To be accurate, there are qualitative differences between terrorism influenced by Jihadists and that influenced by the far-right. The former attacks randomly and spectacularly, not caring exactly who dies, and with no regard for their own life. The latter attacks a specific group, but has no desire to die. Both the Oklahoma bombing by Timothy McVeigh and Anders Brievik’s handiwork in Norway attest to this. McVeigh had an issue with the government and Brievik dreamed of a race war. Lots of people died. The British neo-Nazi David Copeland hoped to spark a race war in order to raise support for the British National Party, setting off bombs in London and targeting gay people along the way. Thomas Mair also had something to say, murdering Jo Cox MP in the street, to do it. This is not to underplay the dangers of Jihadism, it is far more powerful, and a global menace to everyone, including Muslims, who simultaneously get killed and reviled due to the actions of others. This perception does not apply after attacks by fringe elements of the far-right, as they are deemed to be different, not part of the group. Thus far, there is no indication that the attacker at Finsbury Park had any links to any far-right group, or dwelled on its fringes, but he clearly shared their ideas. There is also a difference in the claiming of attacks: far-right groups tend to back away from any association with either a hate crime or a terrorist attack, whereas Al-Qaeda and ISIS will happily claim anything.

One thing the far-right did give us was the concept of the ‘lone wolf’, an individual not part of any organisation, but who absorbs the propaganda they put out, and over time is gradually eased towards action. It is a controversial concept as there are usually links to others and sometimes support. It would be more accurate to describe the ‘lone wolf’ as a ‘self-actualizer’, able to organise themselves and use everyday objects such as vans and lorries to carry out an attack. This concept has been adopted by Al-Qaeda and ISIS, and we have seen the effects across Europe as the alienated and unhappy wreak carnage ‘in the name of’ and stoke the fires of hate, fear, and division. Their actions give sustenance to the far-right and careless newspaper Editors who sensationalise and encourage knee-jerk reactions. In turn, the message is sent out to the alienated and unhappy, who see Jihadism as an answer, and that they really are under threat. The truth is that the Jihadist message is a powerful one and Muslim communities are at the forefront in trying to counter it, as they did at the Finsbury Mosque. Their work just got a whole lot harder. So did that of the security services and the Police, who already had to contend with the combined threat of Northern Ireland related terrorism, the far-right, and the Jihadists.

There is a whole tranche of explanations for why the man who mowed down people in the street did what he did but they won’t work any more than they would when applied to the Westminster attacker or any of the other attacks cited above. Responsibility lies with the individual and those who encouraged him.

There are people who keep on ringing the division bell but no one needs to listen, nor do they need to use one atrocity to justify another. There are some things that the far-right and Islamic extremists do have in common, namely that they have very rigid views and don’t like anyone who is not like them, and that they believe that by carrying out an attack they will provoke a backlash, triggering more and greater violence, and a war their side will win. These are despicable goals and reflect on the people promulgating them as much as they do on the ideology they claim to follow. The other commonality is that all-pervasive one, the self-declared right to take life and the sense of entitlement that comes with it.

For more information regarding this blog see:

http://jtr.st-andrews.ac.uk/articles/10.15664/jtr.405/

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/finsbury-park-terror-attack-van-latest-comments-glorifying-terrorism-reported-government-home-office-a7798356.html

https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/why-finsbury-park-wasnt-immediately-called-a-terror-attack

http://www.belfastlive.co.uk/news/belfast-news/lone-wolf-terrorist-christine-oconnor-13210768

Dr Carl Turner,

Site Coordinator

After months of fighting in the villages and towns on the path to Raqqa an Arab-Kurdish coalition has entered the last major city held by ISIS and its de facto capital. ISIS, by its own definition the ‘Islamic State’, made claim to statehood, one that was vigorously rejected by the vast majority of actual states in the UN and was not recognised by the majority of Muslim leaders. However, the holding of swathes of territory, including cities, the ability to exploit resources such as oil, raise taxes, and continually recruit and raise fighters meant that while ISIS had no recognition or legitimacy as a state it was a proto-state. The loss of Raqqa will be one of a series of losses that have diminished the capacity of ISIS to hold territory and mark the effective end of ISIS as a proto-state.

The group has its origins in the ill-fated Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), who also briefly held the Iraqi city of Fallujah, before being ejected by an alliance of Sunni tribesmen, the Iraqi military, and US forces. When this happened there were none who expected the insurgents to reform and return in the guise of ISIS to occupy swathes of territory, exploiting Sunni disenchantment in Iraq and instability in Syria. As Raqqa shares the fate of Ramadi, Fallujah, Sirte, and Mosul through being decimated in the process of liberation from ISIS the question will be of what happens next.

First, it will be far from over, and the end of ISIS is not in sight. Despite provoking the ire of just about every other actor from within Syria’s charnel house and Iraq’s sectarian divisions the loss of territory means that ISIS will revert to the tactics of insurgency and terrorism through which they took the cities in the first place. This is a continuation of a process which began when the coalition airstrikes began to deny ISIS the ability to operate as a conventional army with massed forces. Freed from the constraints of maintaining cities and defending territory, which requires a visible and strong presence, the group will become more clandestine and work in smaller numbers, with an emphasis on hit and run attacks and suicide bombing. It is very likely that their numbers will decrease, as the harshness of life as an insurgent weeds out the less committed, but the nucleus that remains will be tougher, harder to find, and more self-reliant. There is also the question of ISIS’s continuing internet and human based network in the ‘far abroad’ of Europe, which doesn’t require the existence of a physical Caliphate to promote radicalisation and violence and recruit new volunteers.

It would also be a mistake to think that ISIS can’t return or a new group supplant it in the way that ISIS did Al-Qaeda. Let us not forget the second, whose affiliated groups include a major actor in the Syrian civil war, Jabhat al Nusra, whom preceded ISIS and may well outlast them, if under a different name. ISIS are able to gain allegiance from major groups in countries as far apart as Nigeria and the Philippines, but this amounts to a flag of convenience amplified by ISIS propaganda rather than material support in the form of money, weapons and volunteers. Jihadist groups such as ISIS and Al Qaeda thrive where there are power vacuums and lack of security, poverty, and lack of representation, as exemplified by failed states such as Somalia. In the Middle-East there are two states suffering from a chronic disorder, surviving not because they can provide security, but because outsiders have supported them and non-government forces have backed up their armies. One is Syria, whose government has had to rely on air support from Russia and the troops of Hezbollah and Iranian militias to survive. The other is Iraq, whose government has had to rely on air support from the US led coalition and Shia militias from Iraq and Iran. In both cases the Kurds helped to stem the ISIS advance of 2014 and begin the fight to take back ISIS territory. In Syria, while the government holds the upper hand (deemed unthinkable in 2012), it is far from winning the war and is fighting an opposition that consists of groups described as ‘Moderate’, ‘Islamist’ and ‘Jihadist’. Peace talks do not include the last of these and while predicting the future course of the Syrian war is difficult, there is little room for compromise between the government and the Jihadists and Islamists. In the cases of both Syria and Iraq, territory is held by competing actors and the state is weak and reliant on non-state actors and outside powers for security. This is a situation more dangerous than before the start of Syria’s war in 2011 and the ISIS advance across Iraq in 2014 as a lack of security means a lack of stability and with it the ability to tackle the socio-economic problems that sow the ground for extremism.

We cannot predict what form the future of Jihadist threat will take or where it will arise, but we can make projections based on what has gone before and the conditions on the ground. Firstly, military defeat in the field does not guarantee that jihadist groups will not reappear in a different guise and with the same results. Secondly, the ideology and the means by which it is disseminated are highly developed and survive even when a group is defeated or crippled. It also has a global reach. Third, jihadist and Islamist groups emerge in strength where there is a security vacuum, weak central governance, and/or poor representation and inequality. The challenge facing Iraq is how to reintegrate a Sunni minority and rebuild its population centres, while tackling the remnants of ISIS outside of the cities. Syria’s challenge is very different, the Assad regime is an international pariah and what it intends to do in the northern Idlib Province is uncertain. ISIS hasn’t been defeated yet, although it is on the back foot, but the conditions for a Jihadist revival are already in place, and there is also potential for cooperation between ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra and other groups. Next week we will look at how the changing threat can be countered.

For more information regarding this blog see:

http://www.newsweek.com/us-russia-isis-syria-allies-battle-isis-raqqa-625297

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/al-qaeda-is-eating-us-syrian-rebels-are-losing-out-to-extremists/2017/02/23/f9c6d1d4-f885-11e6-aa1e-5f735ee31334_story.html?utm_term=.b412a0e7a9e1

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/islamic-state

Dr Carl Turner,

Site Coordinator

On the 7^th June ISIS struck the Iranian Parliament building and the tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini. They killed twelve people in suicide attacks targeting two important symbols of Iran’s revolution and government. That Iran is an ISIS target is no surprise, as they are natural enemies. ISIS is an ultra-conservative Sunni influenced organisation with a jihadist agenda and claims to be a caliphate, calling itself the ‘Islamic State’ and Iran is a major Shia majority state, is the ‘Islamic Republic of Iran’ and holds elections, if for candidates selected by the state. Shia militias, Iranian backed and Iraqi, have been at the forefront of the battles in Iraq against ISIS. The Sunni-Shia division in Islam is not the reason for the violence in the Middle-East, but it is a major factor, and the social and political differences between states and sub-state actors in the region centre around it. The surprise is that ISIS has managed to strike at the heart of Tehran, the capital of what is seen as a strong state with a powerful and experienced security apparatus.

In contrast, the government in Afghanistan can hardly be described as strong. In the absence of NATO’s forces they have struggled to contain a resurgent Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the new addition of ISIS, depending strongly on US military support to maintain security. A bomb that struck at Kabul’s diplomatic quarter killed 150 people and injured hundreds more, adding to the woes of a government that is in a permanent state of crisis. The attack was claimed by the Taliban, an ultra-conservative Sunni influenced organisation, which wants to establish an Islamic State in Afghanistan, and had done so previously until the US led NATO intervention in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. After the attack in Kabul a number of people were shot dead during a protest over security and at one of the funerals suicide bombers struck and killed at least twelve people. This time the Taliban have not claimed responsibility. People are up in arms over the question of security and there have been calls for government officials to resign.

On the 30^th May suicide bombers struck in Baghdad in the first of a series of bombings. The first attack took place in the Shia majority Karrada district and killed at least 15 people, injuring over 50 more. The timing and location of the bomb was deliberately callous and provocative: the breaking of Ramadan fasts outside an ice-cream parlour packed with families. In a rare show of solidarity the lights of the Eiffel Tower were turned off, a response common after attacks in Europe. ISIS quickly claimed responsibility for this and other attacks. For ISIS, the Karrada district is a legitimate target as for them the Shia are heretics, a label that dehumanises and invites brutality. Iraq, like Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic state, although in Iraq the Shia are in the majority, clustered in the general region of centre, east, and the south. In Iraq there was no surprise that a bombing took place, or that the ice-cream parlour quickly reopened, or even that the holy month of Ramadan was violated, the surprise was that after years of violence there is still the capacity for new depths.

The above is merely a snapshot of the week after the terrorist attack in London and for the sake of brevity a great deal has been missed out. There is no underlying message here about the nature of conflict-related terrorism and its consequences across the Muslim world. Nor is there an attempt to reduce the violence to the context of a Sunni-Shia split, which would be far off the mark, as politics, power, ethnicity, and lack of representation provide equally pervasive explanations. There is only one message and this is that the terrorism that is taking life and maiming people across the cities of Europe is the tip of the iceberg of a problem in which the only people not deemed worthy of killing are the fundamentalists whom deem only their own extreme ideology worthy and everyone else a legitimate target. This is totalitarianism pure and simple, and in the case of ISIS, the reason why even the most bitter of rivals in the Middle-East wars agree on the need for their destruction. ISIS are losing their territory and the fears of terrorism specialists that they will focus on targets in what they call the ‘far abroad’ are well founded as they revert from proto-statehood and insurgency to a primary tactic of terrorism. The consequences of the battles in Iraq are there to be seen in the rubble of Ramadi, Fallujah, and Mosul, but the consequences of Jihadist ideology reach further. These are felt through the attacks that are truly global and not only the work of ISIS; let us not forget Al-Qaeda and the rest. Terrorism is notoriously difficult to define, although as one commentator quipped ‘we know what it is when we see it’, and the best reduction is that terrorism is the deliberate and random targeting of civilians for political aims in order to send a message and provoke a response. That the message is often lost and the response crippling is but one outcome. Terrorist attacks in Iraq and other parts of the Muslim world are seen as ‘normal’, the ‘new normal’ that the West fears, and they shouldn’t be, buried as they in conflict zones and wars. Despite their loud denunciation of the ‘West’ and its values and vulnerable minorities the Jihadists are managing to kill more Muslims than they do anyone else, trampling over Muslim traditions as they do so. If the lights of the Eiffel Tower went out every time civilians were killed by a terrorist attack somewhere in the world they would remain off for a long time.

For more information regarding this blog see:

http://icsr.info/2017/06/icsr-insight-attacks-tehran-scenarios-implications/

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jun/08/tehran-attack-isis-iran-west-shia-ally

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/world/asia/kabul-bombing-death-toll-increases.html?_r=0

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/03/world/asia/afghanistan-explosion-funeral.html

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/baghdad-attacks-eiffel-tower-dark-victims-car-bombing-iraq-capital-ice-cream-shop-a7764891.htm

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/baghdad-bombings-sign-islamic-state-strength-weakness/

https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/30/iraq-suicide-attacks-targeting-crowds-baghdad

Dr Carl Turner,

Site Coordinator

The third terrorist attack in the space of two months means that the United Kingdom is undergoing a test that it shouldn’t have to take. The UK had seemed to be relatively invulnerable to random Jihadist attacks, as Belgium, France and Germany, all suffered attacks, then Sweden and Russia. Warnings by counterterrorism specialists of the danger of a terrorist attack in the UK were listened to, the people aware of an actual threat, but the attacks did not come. Then three took place in rapid succession, Westminster, Manchester and now London Bridge, in an unprecedented series of attacks. At the time of writing seven people are dead, others are still missing, and many more are in hospital. That more are not dead is due to a swift and terminal response by the British Police.

We have seen the resilience, moments of heroism, unity, kindness and steadfast defiance that have come to define the response of cities to a distinct kind of terrorism, and, as the names and nationalities of the victims show, the international impact of each attack. The brutality of the London Bridge attack is part of a global trauma that has no end in sight. Here we will focus on the UK. The weekly blog, which focuses on international conflict and conflict resolution, will address events worldwide.

There are also the knee-jerk responses, with calls for immediate action against both suspected jihadists and the Muslim communities in which they hide, some of these calls for action happening even before the facts are known. The first is a natural response to those who commit murder under the flag of an illegitimate self-declared state and its brutal ideology, the second is outright discrimination against people who have no love for Jihadists. Anger and the need to maintain the security of one’s country are natural responses when an attack such as that in London takes place, but this should be firmly directed at the architects of violence and not the innocent. The UK learned a hard lesson in counterterrorism during the years of violence in Northern Ireland: hit those who use violence for political ends hard, but don’t punish the communities they claim to represent for the transgressions of the guilty.

Yet, even the most sober analysis indicates that the situation as it stands needs to change. The UK has very robust laws and an experienced counterterrorism capability that includes prevention. Clearly, there has been a failure if people known to the security services go on to carry out an attack, particularly when concerns about individuals have been reported. The cornerstone of the UK’s long term counterterrorism strategy is Prevent, aimed at reducing terrorism of all types, and it is undeniable that Prevent has been controversial. At times it has been misapplied, and so acting counter to its purpose, but in its goal of counter-radicalisation it is a preventative strategy that is valuable, if hard to measure. It is due a review, and this should take place immediately. There is also the question of resources. Both the intelligence services and the Police are woefully under-resourced for the task that they face. Investing in both and increasing their numbers will give them a fighting chance to do their work: the structures for countering terrorism effectively are already in place. The Prevent strategy is also underfunded and needs revision to achieve its goals. There will be an inquiry into how the five attackers ‘slipped the net’, as the killers of Lee Rigby also did, and this needs to be open and honest and free of political agendas and finger pointing.

This is for the future. In the here and now there has been one impact on the UK that needs to be stopped immediately. In the final week of an election campaign the debate has turned firmly towards the question of security. Tomorrow, on the 8^th June, the people of the UK vote for their new government and when they go to the polls they must vote for their party of choice based on all their policies, not only those about security and foreign policy. Finally, the division bell is ringing loudly for all to hear and it should be ignored less we give the bad guys what they want.

For more information regarding this blog see:

http://news.sky.com/story/london-bridge-attack-man-30-arrested-in-ilford-during-raid-10906812

http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/london-bridge-attack-why-the-prevent-programme-is-failing-government-british-muslims-taking-a7776581.html

http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/media/2017/06/why-did-social-media-react-more-responsibly-london-bridge-and-borough-attacks

Dr Carl Turner,

Site Coordinator

This week we set aside the usual focus on current conflicts and take a look at the state of peace in the world, as measured by the Global Peace Index. There is mixed news, as 93 countries improved against 68 that deteriorated, and six out of nine regions in the world became more peaceful over the last year. The 2017 Report can be downloaded for free using the links provided below.

The Global Peace Index (GPI) is released annually and provides a ranking of 163 independent states and territories, covering 99.7% of the world’s population based on 23 indicators. Among other things, it is a useful tool for identifying states at risk of descent into violence and seeing a general overview of the state of peace in the world. The key concept behind the GPI is the idea of the ‘positive peace’, one which underpins peace studies as a whole and has a strong influence on conflict resolution.

Positive peace is better understood in relation to ‘negative peace’ where there is an absence of violence, which can be achieved through non-peaceful means. The goal of the absence of violence is limited and peace is defined as the absence of war. Positive peace is the existence of conditions that promote peace, coined in phrase ‘peace by peaceful means’ and peace is defined by integration. The GPI measures positive peace using eight key pillars, which are a good explanation of what is required for there to be a positive peace. These are:

1. Well functioning government
2. Sound business environment
3. Acceptance of the rights of others
4. Good relations with neighbours
5. Free flow of information
6. High levels of human capital
7. Low levels of corruption
8. Equitable distribution of resources

A country with a high positive peace score is unlikely to deteriorate into internal violence and is also able to withstand a major systemic shock, such as an economic or political crisis. A change in the GPI score, whether it is annual or over a longer period of time, also allows for conflict management and prevention measures. The best analogy for this is a health check.

But was does this mean for conflict resolution? A mistake would be to treat the ending of violent armed conflict, such as terrorism, insurgency and war, and the attainment of the conditions for a positive peace as two separate things, occurring in sequence (negative peace first, positive peace later). While the absence of violence (the negative peace) is a required condition for the achievement of a positive peace, it is not a precondition. Armed conflict takes place due to a contradiction in the aims and goals of competing parties, whom see their aims and goals as incompatible. The goal of conflict resolution is for the parties to reach an understanding whereby violence is replaced by non-violent ways of achieving their aims and goals. One way to do this is to enable the conditions that will lead to the achievement of a positive peace, including personal and economic security, and equality of rights and opportunity. This effectively means laying the foundations for the eight pillars of positive peace while the violence is ongoing, with the dual aim of stopping armed violence and revitalising a society so that it is able to withstand further pressure in the future. The reason that armed conflict re-escalates lays in the failure to build a sustainable peace after violence has ended.

An indication of the importance of the eight pillars of positive peace can be found in the top five performing and bottom five performing countries in the GPI. At the top there is Iceland, New Zealand, Portugal, Austria, and Denmark. At the bottom there is Yemen, South Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. The most peaceful region is Europe, the least peaceful the Middle-East and North Africa. The western UN Security Council countries, with their claims to democratic freedom, would be expected to fare better than most, but GPI scores include such criteria as internal political problems, terrorist events, arms sales, the number of heavy weapons owned, and involvement in wars abroad. These criteria help explain their rankings out of 163 countries: the US comes in at 114, the UK at 41, and France at 51. For comparison, Russia ranks at 151 and China at 116.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://visionofhumanity.org/

http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/06/GPI-2017-Highlights.pdf

http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/06/GPI-2017-Report-1.pdf

http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/05/IPI-Positive-Peace-Report.pdf

http://www.activeforpeace.org/no/fred/Positive_Negative_Peace.pdf

Dr Carl Turner,

Site Coordinator

Libya generally enters the headlines for all the wrong reasons. Last week it was because of the suspected connections between the Manchester bomber, his network, and family. Then, following an attack on Coptic Christians in Egypt the Egyptian air force bombed a jihadist camp in Libya. Looking only slightly further back, when faced with an emerging Syrian civil war the West was wary of intervention due to Libya falling apart after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi. In turn, Russia and China were now suspicious of the motives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States after the UN authorised no-fly zone in Libya transformed immediately into rebel air support.

Both Al-Qaeda and ISIS have their affiliates in Libya, although they are small when compared to the forces of the Tobruk led Government, the rival Government of National Accord and other factions. But civil war creates space for jihadist groups to flourish, and sometimes to actually hold territory, and ISIS held the city of Sirte until December of 2016. This was a major loss as Sirte was a potential fallback for ISIS in the event that both Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq were lost. This, clearly, is increasingly only a matter of time and we have covered the consequences for civilians in Sirte and Mosul in earlier blogs.

Despite ISIS’s current status as the predominant Jihadist terror organisation, both Al-Qaeda and ISIS have consistently called for attacks on targets in the West and have accepted allegiances from groups in countries as disparate as the Philippines, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, Iraq, Nigeria, Iraq, Yemen and Syria. In fact, wherever the state is struggling and civil war is rampant both Al-Qaeda and ISIS are likely to have established a presence. One reason behind this is the same as that in the West: experienced networking, slick advertising, and the exploitation of the alienated and disenfranchised. Outside of the West there is also the possibility of an income, not to be underestimated when jobs are hard to come by and one’s family is starving.

Failed states then, are incubators for groups that thrive in conflict zones, where state infrastructure and the provision of security are weak. But Libya is also the focal point for the refugee crisis besetting Europe. Here the people smugglers can exploit the finances of the desperate and cram them into unsuitable boats, in the knowledge that the Europeans will rescue them. There would be rightfully be an outcry from within Europe if the rescues ceased, but the question of what to do about refugees has produced a political crisis with the EU. But, which is not simply to blame Libya for its current ill’s, for Libya is as much a victim of any country of events outside of its control.

We are then led to an unpalatable truth that specialists in terrorism warn us off. As ISIS is crushed in its Syrian-Iraqi heartland, its destruction being the one thing that otherwise bitter rivals can agree on, its focus moves to what it calls the ‘far abroad’, and this includes the likes of France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The long standing Al-Qaeda and ISIS call (let us not forget Al-Qaeda) to attack Western targets by any means possible becomes a primary focus as ISIS switches to insurgency in territories it does not hold and terrorism in the West (and Russia it must be said). The consequences of the failed state are visible across Libya, Iraq, Somalia and Syria: devastated cities and starvation, and space for every form of illegal organisation to flourish. The consequences in Europe are attacks in its cities, whether by the network-supported bombing in Manchester, or the internet-influenced amateurs in Westminster or Berlin. The home grown ‘lone attacker’ is proving to be a myth, the true difference is in how much support was through the internet, and how much was through a network. One thing that is certain is that the only thing preventing and stopping future attacks is a combined policy of integration, prevention and de-radicalization, and strong counter-terrorist measures that target the people responsible for the attacks and not the wider community that they inhabit and then betray.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/03/libya-controls-170321125820367.html

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/07/libya-civil-war-oil-terminals-benghazi-defence-brigade-sidra-ras-lanuf

http://icsr.info/

Dr Carl Turner,

Site Coordinator