Conflict Analysis and Resolution Information Services

A child holding an assault rifle designed to be used by an adult is a disconcerting sight but one that is all too common in the Central African Republic (CAR) with an estimated 13,000 children having been recruited by armed groups since the civil war began in 2012. This is not unique to the CAR, with the adage that firearms are so simple to use that a child can do it and they frequently do ringing true across contemporary African conflicts. Warlords, such as Joseph Kony of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) favour child fighters as they can be forcibly conscripted, trained to carry out brutal acts, and peacekeeping troops are reluctant to shoot them. When we talk of armed groups other than government forces in the CAR we are talking about adult fighters and the children forcibly recruited to fight alongside them.

The myriad groups involved in the CAR’s war are too many and too complex to be covered in a single blog, but the earlier ones in this series point us towards a general overview of the situation in the period after the Seleka rebels (a coalition of armed groups) seized the capital, Bangui, transforming the conflict. On the government side, the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) was so dysfunctional that the leader of the Seleka coup announced its dissolution and it has been subject to a UN arms embargo, making it largely ineffectual. Some soldiers defected to the Seleka, their successors the ex-Seleka and rivals, the anti-Balaka. The Seleka alliance was disbanded in 2013 after a short period in which it went on the rampage, resulting in the emergence of factions of ex-Seleka whom have fought each other. There is no effective government control outside of Bangui.

The anti-Balaka groups emerged near the end of 2013 as a result of Seleka and ex-Seleka atrocities and while nominally Christian they also have Animists in their ranks. This is in stark contrast to the Muslim dominated Seleka and ex-Seleka, and an indication of the sectarian roots of the contemporary violence, which has seen inter-ethnic driven violence replace that over the question of who rules the CAR. This has led to the mistake of the violence in the CAR being understood as a Muslim-Christian conflict, when this is but one part of it, and neither Muslim or Christian leaders recognise the right of either side to represent their religions or to commit violence on religious grounds. The anti-Balaka holds significant territory amounting to half of the CAR, but are not a single structured organisation and a collection of loosely affiliated groups instead, with ten of them in Bangui alone.

Groups have also formed from within ethnic groups, with an example being the 3R (Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation), which claims to represent the Fulani, protecting this mainly Muslim ethnic group from the atrocities of the anti-Balaka. There are also war entrepreneurs and bandits in evidence across the country with the express aims of either exploiting natural resources or operating locally as armed gangs, profiting from the lack of a viable security. As a landlocked country with six neighbours and inadequate control of its border, the CAR is also vulnerable to armed groups from outside of the country. A notable example is the aforementioned LRA, which is a trans-national actor, and drew the attention of Uganda and the US, both of whom deployed troops to combat the LRA. In the quagmire that is the CAR, the complete lack of security outside of the capital encourages the development of local groups and militias for self defence. Such groups are not guaranteed to remain on the defensive and will attack other ethnic groups in return for the violence committed against their own communities. A vicious cycle of tit for tat violence emerges where the enemy is not simply defined as a group targeting one’s own in-group, but one that is supported by the people they claim to represent. For peacekeepers trying to provide security for both the people and aid workers, this is a formidable barrier, as the situation becomes fluid, the flashpoints varied, and the all important building of working relationships with warring groups more difficult, if not impossible.

Next week we look at peacekeeping operations in the CAR.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://africanarguments.org/2017/07/13/as-car-peace-deal-unravels-uncertainty-looms-for-thousands-of-child-soldiers/

http://www.irinnews.org/report/100623/armed-groups-car

http://www.c-r.org/resources/perspectives-non-state-armed-groups-central-african-republic

https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/28/one-day-we-will-start-a-big-war-central-african-republic-un-violence/

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

The Central African Republic CAR) has a population of 4.6 million, of which an estimated 2.7 million people have been displaced due to violence, meaning that the majority of the population are barely able to survive, never mind contribute to the functioning of a nation-state. As a consequence, the country does not function effectively and is dependent on outside help for food, medical treatment and security. All three are insufficient to mitigate the consequences of a man-made disaster. The Government maintains control in the capital, Bangui, only and is on its third President since the rebel Seleka took control in 2013. The nature of the violence changed rapidly from a rebellion by the Seleka in 2012 to one in which myriad actors are committing atrocities and major human rights violations. The CAR is landlocked, meaning that opportunists have been able to exploit the situation. The notorious Lord’s Resistance Army was able to operate in the CAR, with Ugandan forces entering the country to tackle them. Others are simply herders, seeking new grazing areas for their cattle.

At the heart of the violence is attacks on civilians and the razing of villages and while there is a distinctly religious element to this, with groups identifying as Muslim, Christian and Animist targeting civilians based on their religion and ethnicity, there is also a significant amount of opportunism. The CAR is resource rich and resources mean money and power, whatever one’s religious and ethnic identity may be, and in a country with no effective central government, armed gangs call themselves groups, and go about their bloody business. Marking people out as different and/or inferior due to their religious status, whether because one really believes it or chooses to pay lip service, and making them guilty of being a threat because they are from the other, ‘dangerous’ and ‘threatening’, Muslim, Christian, or Animist communities, allows for dehumanisation. What follows is inhuman.

The outcomes of this are major human rights violations committed at the local level but combining to make a national pattern of ethnic cleansing. A small scale massacre of a village and its burning to the ground is an atrocity that is one too many, but added together they are a major humanitarian disaster that is occurring in a security vacuum. This is despite the efforts of peacekeepers, allowed in by the Government, who are themselves suffering casualties alongside humanitarian workers. When a conflict involves major armed groups with clearly defined goals there is potential for leverage to reduce violence and atrocities and for mediation and negotiation to break down incompatibilities between combatants. The violence in the CAR is fundamentally different as there are multiple actors, most of whom are opportunists or driven by religious and ethnic hatred (or both), and leverage is much harder to apply, as is identifying the perpetrators responsible for inhuman acts. These acts can be summed up as murder, rape, and torture as communities are wiped from existence.

Next week we take a closer look at the combatants involved in the violence.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/05/central-african-republic-civilians-targeted-war

https://www.unocha.org/legacy/car/regional-impact

https://enoughproject.org/conflicts/central-african-republic

https://www.msf.org.au/article/project-news/central-african-republic-consequence-war

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

A mid-week blog means that an event is occurring that is linked to the subjects featuring regularly in this blog. One of these is the plight of the Rohingya in Myanmar, a people barely recognised by the Government, who see them as migrants and their descendents, and unaccepted by their neighbours. Living in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, bordering Bangladesh, the Muslim Rohingya has lived cheek by jowl alongside a Buddhist Rakhine majority and their relationship has been fraught with tension, confrontation, and violence. This has been at the hands of both sides and the situation has not been helped by a history of insurgency by ethnic Rohingya militants, one that had faded into history but reignited in 2016, triggering a major military response and recent attacks have resulted in a major operation by the Myanmar army. In both instances there has been a commensurate escalation in the Rohingya refugee crisis. The blunt truth is that the Rohingya have been disenfranchised and oppressed, there has been an escalation in terrorism and insurgency as a consequence, and the Army dominated Myanmar Government has responded by sending its forces to crush the Rohingya as a people. As is the wont of military rulers, for they still hold power, the response to dissent is to systematically crush anything and anyone who bears any relation to the people challenging them.

The Myanmar Government claims that the Army is conducting a ‘clearance operation’, but in truth they are clearing Rakhine State of all Rohingya, not only insurgents. The Government also claims that they are protecting all the citizens of Rakhine State, but in truth they are party to the systematic oppression of an ethnic group they have no love for. All countries in the international system have the right to maintain security within their own borders to ensure peace and security, but they don’t have the right to oppress when they doing so. What is happening in Rakhine State is the culmination of decades of the treatment of a minority group as second class citizens, if they can actually be termed ‘citizens’ in the conventional sense. The solution to the problems in Rakhine State, which have many authors but include the Government and their predecessors, appears to be the removal of part of the problems through the clear and final eradication of their presence in Myanmar. If this is not triggering alarm bells, then it should.

Tragically, not only is what has been called ethnic cleansing taking place on a massive scale in clear view of the world and with campaigners having been warning of it for years, a people is being systematically displaced, killed and raped. This has now escalated to the point where a cacophony of sound warning of major human rights violations is being matched by the sound of a people dying in plain sight. Before long the people may not be heard of at all. There will be only silence.

The warnings have reached the highest possible level at the UN and the world is hardly ignorant of what is happening in Myanmar as human rights organisations have been documenting it and have collected all the evidence needed to demonstrate the horror of what is happening to the Rohingya. Their oppressors do not see it, for the proponents of hate have been spewing their bile into the ears of their followers for years, presenting the Rohingya as a threat, and the Myanmar Government has made it clear over the years that the Rohingya are not really ‘citizens’. The portents are there of an impending doom that will see the end of the Rohingya in Myanmar and stain their oppressors for a lifetime, adding the Rohingya to a small and tragic list.

It can be stopped. First, by spreading the word of what is happening and saving not only the Rohingya, but also those who are oppressing them from themselves. Secondly by mitigating the consequences and sending aid to Bangladesh, who cannot cope with the refugees and are turning them away. Thirdly, by applying international pressure to the Myanmar Government and reaching the people so that they understand what is happening as monstrous things are happening in their name. Myanmar has reached the brink of a Genocide, which may already have begun and will be seen for what it is when it is over, but what the Government needs is not simply condemnation, but support in turning back from the brink. They need to understand that the international community will help them in this, but will also punish them severely if they continue with their current course of action. There will also be a reckoning, and those responsible will be held accountable, but it is their choice as to whether or not they mitigate their crimes by changing course and halting, then reversing, the damage they have done.

For more information see the earlier blogs on the Rohingya and:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41170570

http://statecrime.org/data/2015/10/ISCI-Rohingya-Report-PUBLISHED-VERSION.pdf

https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/29/burma-satellite-data-indicate-burnings-rakhine-state

https://twitter.com/hashtag/rohingya

https://twitter.com/voicerohingya?lang=en

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/myanmar-restrictions-on-international-aid-putting-thousands-at-risk/

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

In 2007 two of the main rebel groups in the Central African Republic (CAR) signed a peace agreement with the Government, effectively bringing to an end the Central African Republic Bush War, which had been ongoing since 2004. A peace process began, allowing for regional organisations to lower troop numbers in peacekeeping missions, although clashes continued. In 2012 the last remaining major rebel group signed a peace deal. While the activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army constituted a threat, and brought African Union and Ugandan forces into the CAR to combat them, the CAR was on a path to peace with elections being held. Infrastructure, however, was inadequate and the country was notoriously poor and had a poor infrastructure.

Fledgling democracies are generally vulnerable: they attempt to incorporate voting into the selection of governments but are prone to cronyism and subject to violent challenge. Voting implies that the government will be elected by the people and that the results will stand, but the reality is that elections are difficult in former conflict zones and there are challengers willing to take up arms if they feel left out.

Hence the emergence in 2012 of the Seleka rebel coalition, who claimed that there had been a lack of progress since the peace agreement had been signed. This rapidly became a major threat, gaining the allegiance of additional armed groups and becoming a threat to the capital, Bangui. The beleaguered government, led by President Bozizé, had support from Chadian and South African troops, and the Multinational Force for Central Africa (FOMAC), while the US and France deployed forces to protect and evacuate their own citizens. Despite this, the Seleka took the capital in 2013 and its leader, Michel Djotodia, was sworn in as President. He dissolved the Seleka but resigned in 2014, and has since been followed by two elected Presidents. Both sides in the civil war had been accused of war crimes, but these then escalated at the hands of opposing ex-Seleka and ‘anti-Balaka’ vigilantes. The Government controls the capital only, there is no security in the country and sectarian and tit for tat violence is rife. The UN deployed a 12,000 troop peacekeeping mission in 2013, alongside a 2,500 French contingent that has since been reduced. The EU has also deployed a smaller force.

The fighting is no longer a straight fight between the rebel Seleka and the Government. This ended when the Seleka took power. The Seleka were Muslim, their opponents Christian, making the origins of the conflict a sectarian one, but their successors are Muslim (the ex-Seleka) and Christian (anti-Balaka) militias, which are numerous (an estimate gives fourteen rebel groups) and act outside of central control. What was a civil war is now a morass of violence, largely against civilians, by groups that use religious and ethnic justifications for violence. Religious leaders have appealed for calm and reconciliation, with the Pope visiting a Muslim enclave in 2015, but the violence continues. Human rights groups and the UN have warned repeatedly of the danger of genocide and there are accusations of ethnic cleansing. The violence is affecting the capacity of humanitarian organisations to carry out essential work and there has been a large scale displacement of civilians.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13150044

http://www.dw.com/en/the-forgotten-war-in-the-central-african-republic/a-38645938

http://www.newsweek.com/genocide-africa-central-african-republic-654609

https://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/central-african-republic/conflict-profile/

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

This week we return to the case study of South Sudan. In previous blogs the impact of the conflict in terms of famine and the parties involved were introduced and the three part series closes this week by covering conflict resolution measures and their impact.

It could easily have been different. Terrorism is a regular feature of the news: it resonates louder outside of the countries in the Middle-East and Africa where it does the most damage but there have been incidents in Cameroon and Burkina Faso that have stood out. The fallout from the Barcelona attack continues, with the level of organisation a major concern, and there has been a spate of smaller incidents throughout Europe. The Syrian War continues to develop, centred around a multi-pronged attack on ISIS and, alarmingly, there has been a dangerous escalation in the Rohingya crisis. These are all themes that this blog covers.

As is the case with most conflicts in Africa, South Sudan’s war has been subject to mediation from its beginning in 2013, with the country’s anarchic composition a cause of concern at independence in 2011. The East-African Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD) had been heavily involved in mediating the long civil war in Sudan, so immediately became involved as severe fighting between the governing Sudan’s Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the breakaway Sudan’s Peoples Liberation Movement In Opposition (SPLM-IO) led to foreign governments evacuating their nationals. The SPLM had Ugandan support. In 2014 from the combined efforts of IGAD+ (IGAD and the African Union, United Nations, the European Union, China, Norway, the UK, and the US). The ceasefire and associated agreements quickly broke down but talks continued. A peace agreement between the Government and the Murle dominated Cobra Faction of the South Sudan Democratic Movement (SSDM), causing a split in the Cobra Faction. As 2014 went on the violence became more ethnically based and began to involve a myriad of groups, as described in the earlier blog post ‘South Sudan Part Two: Who is fighting whom?’ In June 2014 an agreement was reached between the SPLM and SPLM-IO for talks about a transitional government, but these quickly fell apart.

The breakthrough, in what was becoming a complex conflict situation, took place in August 2015 when the SPLM leader Salva Kiir and SPLM-IO leader Riek Machir signed a peace agreement brokered by IGAD+, which returned Machir to his former role of Vice-President and led to the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from South Sudan. With a fragile peace at hand, President Kiir decided to increase the number of states in South Sudan and appoint governors loyal to him. The outcome was a split in the opposition, followed by fighting in the capital, Juba, between forces loyal to Kirr and Macher, during which UNMISS struggled to protect civilians. Since August 2016 the SPLM and SPLM-IO have been back at war, but with the additional dimension of splits in the Opposition (which always consisted of groups other than the main SPLM-IO) and groups that back the Government. The original conflict over governance between the SPLM and SPLM-IO is still ongoing but has become secondary to ethnically based violence and the mobilisation of armed organisations specifically linked to an ethnic group. Some are allied to the Government or Opposition, others operate independently.  Violence has spread to parts of the country previously unaffected. Human rights violations have taken place and continue to do so.

The peace agreement, the ambitious ‘Agreement on the Resolution of the Crisis in the Republic of South Sudan’ (ARCSS), which envisaged a transitional government and set a framework by which it could be achieved, is effectively dead. Likewise, the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) it established. The SPLM-IO is considerably weaker than before due to splits in the Opposition, and neither of the SPLO or the groups fighting their own turf wars has shown signs of being willing to compromise. ARCSS has been described as ‘uniquely ambitious’ for what was a broken country and tried to return the country to the same political status as before when personal, ethnic and political differences had led to the outbreak of the civil war in the first place. There are also doubts about the sincerity of the sides involved in negotiations, who seemed more concerned with preserving their previous status over the hopes of all the citizens of South Sudan. The AU, IGAD+, and the UN continue with their search for a mediated solution.

In the meantime, the level of violence and the danger of genocide in Sudan marks the country out as being in desperate need of intervention and a trend in the management of the conflict is that this is moving from peacekeeping to peacemaking. The UN and regional forces have been on the back foot in terms of defending civilians due to the conflict transforming from a political one to one driven by ethnic rivalries. Peacekeepers will always strive to maintain the peace, despite rarely having the resources to do so, but they are dependent on the parties to the conflict toeing the line. This is not the case in South Sudan, where the size of the country and the diversity and distribution of ethnic groups prevents peacekeepers from being present at every flashpoint in order to prevent harm. Peacemaking, on the other hand, provides the muscle and authorisation to tackle transgressors directly. UNMISS is being beefed up by the deployment of the Regional Protection Force (RPF) and the UN and AU have not ruled out further forces. If they wish to manage the violence, protect civilians, and prevent genocide, they will need to commit more resources able to enforce the peace. This is a solution few want, as only a political solution will resolve the conflict and enforcing the peace carries huge risks and a long commitment.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/10/world/africa/south-sudan-fast-facts/index.html

http://dayan.org/content/tel-aviv-notes-igad-and-south-sudan-success-and-failure-mediation

http://newafricanmagazine.com/aus-three-options-south-sudan/

https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/civil-war-in-south-sudan

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

This week we interrupt the series of blogs on South Sudan and return to one of our all too common themes. A blog focused on conflict and its resolution is tied to the events that occur in the world and attacks in European cities are linked to one of our main themes, which is jihadist groups such as ISIS and violence related to them. The blog is also being published early.

Referring to an attack of terrorism as being ISIS linked is, it must be said, an assumption, as the group invariably claims an attack in Europe as its own when it has had no direct input in organising it, and one can become a martyr for ISIS by claiming allegiance and driving a vehicle into a crowd. This makes counter-terrorism difficult as the attack can be planned in isolation and carried out by amateurs with deadly consequences. While this is the case with lone attackers, the Barcelona and Cambrils attacks were carried out by cells, not individuals, as was the case in the London Bridge attack. Fake suicide vests were also worn, which guarantees that people will be terrified and that the Police will respond with lethal force. Yet counter-terrorism is not impossible as people do not choose violence overnight: there is a radicalisation process, which results in changes in behaviour, and leaves a trail of confrontation and internet exploration and communication. They also come under the watchful eye of the security services, and we wait to see if any of the perpetrators of the attacks in Catalonia were known to them.

There is a pattern of events all too familiar: the attack happens and people are maimed or killed, the attackers are swiftly stopped, life returns to normal, there is international solidarity, and what the security services knew of the attackers is put under scrutiny. Both Spain and the United Kingdom were seen as resilient to Jihadist inspired attacks due to their better integration of Muslims. This has proved to be a fallacy. The ISIS ideology in particular focuses on the alienated and disenfranchised, one does not need to be a Muslim to experience this, but ISIS provides the vulnerable with an explanation based on Western opposition to Islam. That this is a false rhetoric, largely described as so by Muslim leaders, means little to the recruit as it is highly developed and pervasive. It also provides an explanation for alienation and a means by which action can be taken.

The attacks in Europe are the tip of the iceberg of a much larger battle for dominance with implications across the Islamic world. One that has pitted Muslim against Muslim and has drawn the attentions of the West, whom are not blameless in the events that have transpired, but has seen most of the devastation occur in the Middle-East. Various labels have been applied to describe the ideology of the fundamentalist Islamic groups and their emergence has been aided by the lack of representation in countries of the Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) and the foolish support of governments pursuing strategic goals against each other. The US-led global war on terror (GWOT) was an ill-conceived and badly implemented intervention in response to the actions of a group professing a violent ideology and implacably opposed to western culture and democracy. The most apt description that this writer has seen is Salafi-jihadism, as described by Shiraz Mayer, which draws on Islamic teachings and takes the fundamentalism of Salafism, which can be very conservative but not necessarily violent, and uses it to justify a jihadist ideology. This has a long history but Al-Qaeda and ISIS are very good examples. It carries a powerful message as it draws on Islamic teachings and is self-justifiably violent, marking its enemies as infidels and worthy only of slaughter. This applies to the secular West, other religions, Muslims not following the Salafist creed, and anyone who chooses to leave the faith. Should civilians, including other Muslims, get in the way their deaths are sanctioned due to the wider goal of creating the ‘Caliphate’. In fact, while there are a lot of things that are forbidden there is a lot more that is allowed in pursuit of the cause and one does not have to worry about understanding Islamic scripture to do so. Moreover, the clear delineation between followers of the creed and everyone else, the worthy and the unworthy, believer and non-believer, is defined by them. The holy warriors are at war, whether their opponents realise it or not, and giving their opponents little choice in the matter. Objection makes one an unbeliever and worthy of punishment. If this sounds like totalitarianism then there is a simple explanation: it is totalitarianism.

So where does this leave cities like Barcelona and towns like Cambrils? The shortest answer is: vulnerable. Attacks in the European cities and towns are high profile events in a wider war, which provide publicity for the jihadists and succour for their supporters. Experts in terrorism and counter-terrorism specialists have warned repeatedly of the danger of attacks by groups which have openly declared war on the ‘West’. The adaptation to using everyday objects such as cars and vans has the advantage of enabling the alienated and disenfranchised to strike back, usually in their home country. The aims are to foment disorder, divide the population and provoke a response. Should the response be discrimination against Muslims in, for example, Spain or the United Kingdom, then all well and good in the eyes of the jihadists as this means more potential recruits. Should it draw out a military response, all the better, as it demonstrates the truth of the jihadist message, and also means more recruits. In the event that the result is the withdrawal of Western forces from one of their ill-conceived interventions then this is declared a victory. Either way, the likes of ISIS will treat it as a win, and when they are gone their successors will do the same.

Sadly, Western leaders do get it wrong and often act against the wishes of their people, but they also learn and question their actions. The correct response to terrorism is to reduce the possibility of a successful attack, directly target the perpetrators only, and address the concerns of the people the terrorists claim to represent, in effect a blend of coercion and reform. This works better for domestic terrorism, having already proven successful in Spain and the United Kingdom, but struggles against global jihad, with its absolutist message. It will, however, work against home grown extremists inspired by Salafi-Jihadism, who form a large number of the people who have carried out attacks. The most powerful response is one that the nations of Europe and North America in particular have hit upon: unity in the face of tragedy and an ability to quickly return to normality. Las Ramblas was open again the next day, with subdued tourists present who had witnessed the violence the day. There are divisions as a result of attacks in European countries, to be sure, but this is roundly condemned when it descends to populism and racism. There is also an increasing awareness of the impact of extremism in the Middle-East in particular: by attacking the cities of Europe the jihadists have managed to make Europeans see the impact of attacks in cities such as Baghdad in a clearer light. Ultimately the jihadist ideology is self-defeating wherever it rears its absolutist head. Sadly, there may be much more damage because of them.

This blog has carried one consistent message in relation to the attacks in Europe this year and it remains the same: Fear, anger and hate are what the bad guys want: don’t let them have it.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40964242

http://icsr.info/projects/

https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/mar/24/salafi-jihadism-shiraz-maher-crusade-jihad-malcolm-lambert-review-patrick-french

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/15/islamism-salafism-and-jihadism-a-primer/

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

The previous week has seen tensions between the US and North Korea and political problems in Venezuela hit the headlines. The first is a longstanding problem dating back to the 1950’s Korean War, which left the Korean Peninsula divided along the 38^th Parallel and a permanent US presence in the South. Differences arise regularly between the regime in the North and the US, but the current escalation is alarming due to the bluster coming from Pyongyang and Washington. This is qualitatively different from before and risks triggering a military confrontation and the resumption of the war between the two Koreas. In Venezuela political violence is taking place due to the country’s President moving to consolidate his power in the face of protests from the political opposition. The country has been badly run for years and has collapsed economically, causing its citizens to leave. The government’s response to the crisis has been to crack down hard on dissent and the politicians whom oppose it. Both situations are worrying and potentially catastrophic. It is hoped that they won’t appear on this blog in the near future. It is very likely that they will.

This week we return to South Sudan, its civil war a vicious and unnecessary spate of violence that has been ongoing since 2013. South Sudan covers a significant area and is slightly larger than France but with a much smaller population of between 10 and 12 million. There are up to sixty indigenous ethnic groups in the country and the population identifies strongly with their ethnic groups and there are longstanding minor conflicts over land and cattle. The largest, by far, is the Dinka (36%) and the second largest is the Nuer (16%) and despite the independence of South Sudan in 2011 the various ethnic groups lean towards community elders rather than national political parties. Ethnic differences were not the cause of the civil war, which was due to political rivalry, but as the fighting has worsened inter-ethnic violence has taken place, and the UN has warned of the potential for genocide. The origins of the civil war are unmistakably about political power and the rivalry between President Salva Kiir and Vice-President Riek Machir, two former rivals. They also represented the two major ethnic groups, Kiir being Dinka and Machir Nuer, and when Kiir dismissed his entire cabinet, including Machir, in 2013 fault lines within the ruling Sudan’s Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) became clear, with Kiir later claiming that Machir was plotting against him. The Sudan’s Peoples Liberation Movement In Opposition (SPLM-IO) was formed but the conflict quickly became defined along ethnic lines, with the two sides targeting other ethnic groups who supported their opponents. Uganda entered the conflict in 2013 on the Government side. Despite mediation and ceasefires, with Machir briefly returning as Vice-President in 2016, the two sides remain divided, with power and oil at stake. Neither side is free of responsibility for the quagmire that South Sudan has become, a tragedy given the decades of violence that preceded the country’s independence and for which the SPLM fought.

The Opposition began as defectors from the SPLM but it has attracted the support of other political parties and their affiliated armies with splits occurring in the opposition movement since 2014. An example, and major group, is the Nuer White Army, which numbers some 25,000 fighters. It has come into conflict with the Murle ethnic group, represented by the Greater Pibor Forces, formed after a split occurred in the opposition in 2014. Militias have also arisen when ethnic groups are threatened: the Azande Arrow Boys emerged due to attacks by Dinka cattle herders, while the Shiluk Tiger Faction New Forces (TFNF) emerged due to the redrawing of political boundaries. The Government has also seen its forces divide amongst themselves and the latest split occurred in 2017 when a high ranking Officer defected from the SPLM and formed the National Salvation Front (NSF), declaring allegiance to Machar. These are examples from many that reflect Opposition splits, Government defections, ‘self defence militias’, and pre-existing organisations, which have allied with either side. A general picture is of the SPLM and its allies facing an Opposition that has shed off numerous splinters, some of whom are fighting both the Government and Opposition, and other groups allied to no-one. Within this morass of allegiances and counter- allegiances is a complicated patchwork of violence driven by ethnicity that has seen ethnic-cleansing. Regions of South Sudan have become a free-for-all that a beleaguered peacekeeping force has struggled to mitigate, amongst calls for it to respond more aggressively. This force is now growing in strength and capability and is trending towards becoming a peacemaking force.

Next week: Mediation and ceasefires.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/ethnic-groups-of-south-sudan.html

https://blogs.prio.org/MonitoringSouthSudan/2017/06/an-overview-south-sudans-civil-war/

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/south-sudans-civil-war-spirals-genocide-leaving-ghost-towns-wake/

http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article57042

http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=58273

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

Last week we looked at the current state of violence in Somalia, which has impacted on its neighbours Kenya and Ethiopia, and has contributed towards a major humanitarian crisis, as was the case in Yemen. That warfare worsens and creates food shortages, curtails medical care and creates health crises, and destroys the state infrastructure providing for basic human needs is nothing new. Throughout history pillage has supported armies after wanton destruction and the modern remedy of the Geneva Conventions and other attempts to alleviate the inhumanity of warfare are comparatively recent innovations that are ignored more often than not. To the west of Ethiopia is the Republic of South Sudan, an oil rich country with a population of between ten and twelve million people. The current population is difficult to estimate due to a refugee crisis.

South Sudan became independent from Sudan in 2011 after decades of fighting and is the world’s youngest country. It is also one of its bloodiest. A civil war has been underway since 2013 between the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO), which originated in a dispute over governance but has manifested itself along ethnic lines. The lowest estimate for casualties is 50,000 and the highest is 300,000 as it is difficult to get accurate casualty figures. In some regions there is famine described by the UN as manmade, and rape is endemic. The violence has led to the displacement of over three and a half million people, with one and half million fleeing to neighbouring countries. To put this in context, the number of refugees who are housed in refugee camps in Uganda alone is larger than the movement of refugees across the Mediterranean to the European Union.

The civil war began with a split between the President, Salva Kiir, and the Vice-President, Riek Machir, in which Kiir accused Machir of planning a coup d’état and this quickly escalated into serious fighting between their followers. We should be clear that the dispute was over governance in what has been described as a kleptocracy. That Kiir is an ethnic Dinka and Machar an ethnic Nuer has meant that ethnicity became a major factor in how the sides have divided and has had a significant influence on the progression of the violence, which has drawn in other ethnic groups. Last year, the UN Special Advisor on Genocide warned that the conflict had transformed into an ethnic one with potential for genocide. Both sides have been accused of serious human rights violations, including sexual violence, the recruitment of child soldiers, the targeting of civilians, and attacks on UN staff and peacekeepers. Access to food has become a weapon, in a country where famine has been declared in some regions.

Mediation between the two sides has been attempted since the violence started with the regional Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD) concluding eight peace deals with the aid of other countries and the African Union (IGAD-PLUS). In August 2015 the two sides ceased violence and attempted to work together with Machar back as Vice-President but this agreement broke down in July 2016. Fighting between the two sides is ongoing and there have been splits in the opposition forces, leading to infighting and an increase in the number of warring parties. The UN has had a peacekeeping force in South Sudan since independence (UNMISS) and while this has proved unable to contain the violence it has provided witness to the conflict and may have prevented it from being worse. The deployment of a Regional Protection Force (RPF) in agreement with the South Sudan Government has begun and will bolster the strength of UNMISS. The African Union has previously deployed into Sudan and Somalia and is poised to deploy a mission to South Sudan.

A more robust force geared towards peacemaking over peacekeeping may be needed to prevent outright ethnic cleansing taking place or even a genocide. Historians may note that there was a UN presence in Rwanda in 1994 at a time when people had been disarmed. Next week we will look at the protagonists involved in South Sudan’s civil war.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

https://enoughproject.org/conflicts/south-sudan

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25427965

http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/africa/2017/04/clear-winners-south-sudan-war-170420093525610.html

https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/south-sudan/quick-facts-what-you-need-know-about-south-sudan-crisis

http://www.newsweek.com/south-sudans-refugees-most-africa-keep-fleeing-violence-continues-556250

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

In the previous two weeks we looked at the civil war in Yemen, noting that the war has had a direct impact on creating and sustaining the humanitarian crisis in the country. Looking south, there is Somalia, which is also undergoing a humanitarian crisis, is food insecure, and is heavily dependent on foreign aid. In a country of over 14 million people three million are in an ‘emergency need’ of food, while another 6.2 people are in ‘dire need’ of food. The last famine in 2011 killed 250,000 people and the current hotspot for violence and potential famine is in the south. The reason for the food shortages is two severe droughts, the reason foreign aid cannot get through is conflict and roadblocks put up by the jihadist group al Shabaab and the clans that dominate Somali politics.

Somalia has been in a state of conflict since 1991 and has been subjected to repeated outside intervention and for a period of time was a failed state as opposed to the recovering state that it is today. The battle against al Shabaab is the latest phase of the civil war that has raged mostly in the south of the country. The self-declared state of Somaliland and semi-autonomous region of Puntland, both in the north, have been comparatively peaceful. The establishment of a divisive Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2004 was followed by the formation of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a group of Sharia courts, who became a major rival to the TNG and by the end of 2006 they controlled most of the south of Somalia. ICU success led to rival secular warlords in Mogadishu uniting in the battle against the ICU but they were defeated. The TNG allied with Ethiopia and the US in order to defeat the ICU and their leaders have either left the country or reconciled with the government, with the exception of al-Shabaab, who broke away and declared allegiance to Al-Qaeda in 2012. Since this time they have battled the troops of the TNG and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISON) and faced airstrikes and the special forces of the US. Between 2011 and 2012 Kenya launched an incursion into Somalia in alliance with the TNG against al Shabaab, leading to the group being forced out of the cities. Ethiopia also deployed troops in limited numbers and has since joined AMISON, alongside Kenya after their incursion ended in an al Shabaab defeat. AMISON currently has troops from Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Sierra Leone. The US also targets al Shabaab due to its alliance with Al-Qaeda.

While al Shabaab is on the back foot the continuation of Somalia’s torturous path to peace is not guaranteed. The country is heavily dependent on foreign military support in its battle against al Shabaab, who remain intransigent and capable of launching attacks such as that in Nairobi in 2013, when 67 people were killed in a shooting at the Westgate shopping mall. There are also overlaps with the conflict in Yemen, as al Shabaab has many foreign recruits, including from Kenya, and a large number have transited to Yemen to fight for AQAP. This is consistent with al Shabaab being part of a wider network of a wider jihadist network, with some members declaring allegiance to ISIS. Some 3000 foreign troops are said to have been killed battling the Islamist insurgency (ICU, then al Shabaab), raising the possibility that there may be a finite limit to the commitment of troops to AMISON. Notably, both Ethiopia and Burundi have increasing internal problems of their own, bringing into question their future willingness to commit troops.

While Somalia is more representative than was previously the case, it still has major problems with corruption and clan rivalry, a humanitarian crisis, and areas still held by al Shabaab. Even without the jihadist group in the picture, the clans still fight each other, and sometimes the government, whose institutions have a limited impact at a time when strong governance is needed. Somalia’s coherence as a country and better representation are an improvement on the extensive clan based violence of the past, but this is relative, meaning that the country is still undergoing a major crisis and needs outside support much as before. There is a possibility that without AMISON (or a replacement UN force) and foreign aid the country may slip back to being a failed state.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b125-instruments-pain-iii-conflict-and-famine-somalia

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094632

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/02/23/whats-next-for-somalia/

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/somalia.htm

http://www.aljazeera.com/topics/organisations/al-shabab.html

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

Last week we looked at the civil war in Yemen, noting its origins, participants and consequences. Here we will look at the prospects for the resolution of the war between the Houthi dominated Supreme Political Council allied to former President Saleh and the Hadi-led government and their allies. This excludes the jihadist organisations AQAP and ISIS.

It is tempting to view Yemen’s war solely as a consequence of the Arab Spring, but this would be misleading as major political strife in what is now Yemen has been ongoing since 1960 (whether as a civil war in North Yemen, South Yemen, or between the two), after unification in 1994, and there has been a Houthi insurgency since 2004 with failed ceasefires up until 2010. Turmoil prior to the 1990 unification was heavily influenced by the Cold War, the 1994 civil war over the socialist South’s wish to secede, while the Houthi insurgency has taken on a distinctly sectarian bent. The revolution in 2011, backed by the Houthi leadership, was followed by a period of minor clashes between Houthi and Sunni tribes and the leadership were involved in debate over the Yemen’s political future. The current civil war began in 2015 after Houthi forces took the capital city of Sana’a, dissolved the parliament and forced the President to flee. From this perspective, the incompatibility between the two sides is over the governance of what used to be North Yemen.

The clear divisions in regional support for the warring Yemeni factions indicate a second incompatibility. Houthi support comes from Iran and Hezbollah, but support for the Hadi government comes from a Saudi led coalition of mainly Sunni states in the form of a major military intervention. This has led to the war in Yemen being called a proxy war between Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia, and with some justification, even if the coalition intervention means that the weight of external support falls heavily on the side of the Hadi government and the bombs fall on the Houthi rebels. The second incompatibility is the divide between Sunni and Shia, which infuses the politics of the Middle-East. With this comes the de facto opposition of the US, UK and France to Iran and their informal alliance with Saudi Arabia. China, Iran, and Russia oppose military intervention in Yemen, although Iran is believed to have provided direct and indirect support to the Houthis.

Then there are the underlying problems that triggered the 2011 revolution and gave added impetus to the Houthi insurgency and provided the platform for their military success in early 2015. These are common to those in other countries affected by the Arab Spring and Winter: the failure of the ruling bargain and the call for better representation. For Yemen, this has occurred in a country that was young, had weak central governance, and was already damaged by internal conflict. As we have seen, the consequences of the current civil war and coalition airstrikes have turned a political and humanitarian crisis into a fully fledged catastrophe. Without a resolution to the current civil war there can be no political solution to the problems that triggered the revolution.

The UN has appointed an envoy, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, and holds talks in an effort to negotiate a solution, the Yemen ‘Quartet’ (US, UK, UAE and Saudi Arabia) meet to discuss how the international community can help resolve the conflict, and there have been prisoner swaps through tribal mediation. The UN has thus far proved powerless in the face of intransigence from both warring parties as neither has reached the position whereby they consider their war unwinnable. This gives them little will to compromise and so no incentive to enter into negotiations, making mediation extremely difficult. Nor are the Supreme Political Council likely to view the ‘Quartet’ with anything other than suspicion as it includes two countries involved in the war on the Hadi government’s side and another two countries whom have armed and trained them. Any solution put forward by this group is extremely likely to favour Saudi interests over that of the Houthis. The mediation by tribal groups is another matter, for they have a significant influence within Yemen and have survived social and political change within the country. Their roots run far deeper than that of the young nation-state and its twentieth century predecessors.

There are numerous barriers to resolving the conflict in Yemen, but the two incompatibilities above stand out. The first, over governance, is decades old, but has its current roots in the Houthi insurgency of the early twenty-first century at a time when leaders of the Middle-East are being called to account for failing to deliver prosperity. It is an example of repeated mediation and failure to settle the position and status of the Houthis in a country that is attempting to bring in a representative government. If the civil war is placed in the context of the Houthi insurgency, then it dates back to when it began in 2004 and this is important. Civil wars, akin to wars in general, have a lifespan, and while longer than interstate wars, they average out at ten years, meaning that the parties involved are more likely to be reaching the point where they see political opportunities as more fruitful than the military. Also, the less number of parties involved the better, and Yemen only has two when the jihadists are discounted. The question is then as to how the warring parties can be convinced that this is the case and enter into negotiations with UN support.

The second incompatibility, the sectarian between Sunni and Shia, is more difficult as it involves the outside parties and influences their aims and objectives with regards to the first incompatibility over governance. Put simply, Saudi Arabia doesn’t want a Shia influenced government on its southern border to add to its problems with the chaos in Iraq, over its northern border. Iran has a very different perspective: the Houthi and Shia are kin of sorts and a problem for Saudi Arabia is a boon for Iran in their regional rivalry. The support from these countries and their allies is allowing the civil war to be fought at a more intense level and Saudi intervention may have prevented the Houthi from actually winning. The difficulty is that both sides would need to be convinced to end their support, but both have committed resources and both want to see their favourites win. Should the Western powers of the UN Security Council see fit to influence the regional powers in this regard they are faced with the problem that their moral authority is seen as dubious at best and they are aligned with one side and have an adversarial relationship with the other. Yet, there are two factors that could provide leverage and influence both Saudi Arabia and Iran, although it should be noted that these are speculative.

The first is the Jihadists, AQAP and ISIS, whose presence in the Middle-East in general is a major problem for both Saudi Arabia and Iran. For Iran, they are a natural enemy as they are predominantly extremists preaching a fundamentalist Sunni ideology. For Saudi Arabia they are a problem as they challenge its dominance as the leading country of the Sunni faith and have become a major liability politically. The countries of the global west are becoming increasingly pressured by their populations to call Saudi Arabia to account for its role in spreading of fundamentalism. The second is the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, which cannot be tackled effectively while a war is raging, as humanitarian crises means refugees and instability that spreads abroad. While Saudi Arabia is directly in the way, Africa is close by, and a Houthi refugee crisis would cause alarm to both Iran and Hezbollah, with implications elsewhere for Iran’s aims in the Middle-East. This is not forgetting that a humanitarian crisis is anathema morally, and the leaderships of Saudi Arabia and Iran are still accountable to their people in this respect, despite being powerful theocracies.

It can be seen that there are significant obstacles to achieving peace in Yemen and their being overcome is in the hands of regional powers who are fundamentally opposed to each other. While there are factors that encourage cooperation to end Yemen’s war, namely the presence of the Jihadists and the humanitarian crisis, these are not guaranteed to be sufficient to overcome a powerful regional rivalry and are speculative unless concrete and pragmatic action is taken to influence both the regional powers of Saudi Arabia and Iran. The withdrawal of external military support is crucial to the de-escalation of Yemen’s war and the influencing of the warring parties towards the abandonment of a military strategy to achieve their goals.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://archives.forusa.org/blogs/rene-wadlow/yemen-conflict-solutions-unnecessary-war/13354

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/04/26/is-there-a-path-to-peace-in-yemen/

http://carnegieeurope.eu/2010/03/19/tribal-conflict-and-resolution-in-yemen-event-2832

https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-peace-possible

http://www.bmiresearch.com/articles/yemen-still-far-from-conflict-resolution

http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/viable-peace-proposal-within-reach-both-parties-yemen-conflict-despite-heavy-fighting

https://www.insightonconflict.org/blog/2017/03/peacewatch-yemen-march-2017/

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator