Conflict Analysis and Resolution Information Services

This week’s blog briefly reviews the ongoing series on conflict in Africa, which thus far has covered Somalia, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Of these, Somalia has been in continuous conflict the longest, with the current conflict taking place between al Shabaab and the Transitional National Government (TNG). South Sudan is a relatively new country, emerging from the Sudanese civil war in 2011, with a dispute between the President and Vice-President escalating into a civil war exacerbated by ethnic differences. In the Central African Republic (CAR) fighting broke out between the government and the Seleka rebel coalition in 2012 and the Seleka took power and were dissolved by their leader. Since then rival militias have emerged along ethnic and religious lines, or due to simple opportunism and the results have been brutal. Finally, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which is purportedly at peace after the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement ended the Second Congo War in 2003, there has been continuing violence in the east of the country and a recent flaring of violence in its Kasai Central region. The former is due to opportunism and banditry over valuable resources alongside the ethnic differences and regional rivalries that provided the spark for the Second Congo War (this includes the Hutu-Tutsi conflict). The latter began over a regional succession of power that linked in with a political crisis between the government and the opposition but quickly became an ethnic one, spawning numerous rival militias and provoking brutal action by the Congolese Army.

This would all make Africa seem a searing mass of violence driven by ethnic differences. It should be made clear that this is not the case. Firstly, this blog derives from a website focused on conflict analysis and resolution, meaning that the focus will be explicitly on current cases of armed conflict, whether in Africa or not. One of the blog’s aims is to provide a focus on conflicts in Africa that do not get the attention they warrant outside of Africa where attention is more focused on events in the northern hemisphere. Another aim is to understand better conflict resolution within Africa and local and regional approaches towards the ending of armed violence. Secondly, the focus on armed conflict generally excludes the countries that are peaceful and are more concerned with the more mundane but crucial matters of their economy and political representation. Even within the countries suffering from violence there are hotspots of violence and other areas that are comparatively unaffected and continue as normal. Thirdly, the causes of the conflicts covered are not ethnic, even if ethnicity comes to form a major identifying factor, but relate to whom holds power over whom, the level of representation in society, and who controls what resources in a given area. Identification with an ethnic group is a matter of birth, not personal choice, and ethnicity comes to the fore in terms of how one is identified by someone else. While ethnicity is not a root cause of conflict, it does become a major source of difference when it is politicised.

A general overview of the four cases presented in the blog so far indicates general patterns in terms of the consequences of the conflicts in Somalia, South Sudan, the CAR and the DRC. The most devastating is the overall impact of violence on the local populations, notably in the form of human rights violations, access to medical care and employment, and the availability of food. The scarcity of medical care and food has led to famines and outbreaks of disease that would not normally have occurred or could have been mitigated. The lack of employment means that people cannot buy food or access medical care even if it is available and are then dependent on humanitarian aid or local conflict economies. The outcome is that people move, en mass, to other parts of the country or across the border into neighbouring countries, thus becoming internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees. Aside from the sheer cost of hosting refugees this brings with it the potential for instability in the host country and contributes to the development of what are known as regional conflict complexes. Refugees are rarely welcome, wherever they go, and even the nominally advanced economies of the EU states do not prevent political differences over what to do about refugees. The human rights violations that have taken place in South Sudan, the CAR and the DRC have included mass murder, rape and torture, all of which require the victims to have been dehumanised in the eyes of the perpetrators. The majority of casualties in the four cases are civilians, often on the basis of their ethnic or religious identity. Human rights violations are so evident in the conflicts that the CARIS website covers that a Human Rights Advisor was recruited.

Contributing to the emergence of armed conflict in the four cases is the existence of previous conflicts that have either carried on locally after a national or regional peace agreement or are new ones resulting from unequal political representation after such agreements. In the wake of major conflicts new governments are notoriously fragile, relying on either military capability or promises of better political representation while at the same time attempting to rebuild their country. Without outside help this is near impossible, but the benefits can be seen in Western Europe and the Marshall Aid provided to countries rebuilding after the Second World War. Without the resources to rebuild and effective political accountability corruption and profiteering is enabled and politics risks becoming dominated by religious and ethnic identities with politicians mobilising their support along ethnic lines. At the local level economies become vulnerable to warlords who will exploit the situation for their own benefit. A further contributing factor is lack of security as this depends on rule by consent and effective but impartial control of the territory within a country’s borders. Without genuine and equal political representation the army and the police are unable to police by consent and provide security, leaving the vacuum to be filled by militias raised for a multitude of reasons, including self-defence, but which have the tendency to revert to ethnic cleansing, rape and opportunism. The security vacuum that is evident in all four cases has been mitigated by the UN and contributions from regional organisations such as the EU and AU as well as interventions by individual external actors. These are frequently undermanned and, in case of the UN in particular, require the consent of the parties involved in a conflict to carry out peacekeeping. This is much more difficult when a conflict is in fact a number of micro-conflicts involving an alphabet soup of armed groups and the forces of the government are implicated in human rights violations. The solution in the CAR’s eastern provinces was to revert to peacemaking by actively fighting major militias but if this becomes a general norm then the UN becomes a participant in conflict instead of providing the space for conflicts to transition to non-violence.

This short review indicates that lack of political representation and lack of security are key contributors to armed conflicts in the four cases covered. In South Sudan, the CAR and the DRC government forces, their opposition, and myriad armed groups and militias of varying size have all been involved in human rights violations against civilians resulting in humanitarian refugee crises. In all four cases there has been substantial intervention by external actors, including the UN and regional organisations, to mitigate the consequences of the violence, provide mediation, and to put peacekeepers on the ground.  The full story cannot be covered in one blog and the reader is encouraged to read the previous blogs on Somalia, South Sudan, the CAR and the DRC where the origins and nature of the armed conflicts in each country are covered in more detail, as are the attempts to end the violence and potential solutions.

The blogs can be accessed at the CARIS website, which has links for Twitter and Facebook:

https://turnerconflict.com/

Next week, the blog returns to the situation in Syria for an update on events there.

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

The current UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has its origins in an observation mission in 1999 at a time when the Second Congo War was in progress and the forces of nine countries and numerous militias were fighting in the country. Then known as MONUC it became MONUSCO in 2010, with its size reaching over 20,000 when uniformed and non-uniformed personnel are taken into account. While it has provided valuable support to civilians in the DRC it has also been beset by failures and controversies, the most damaging being that troops from the UN force have themselves been involved in human rights violations. In 2017 over 600 troops were withdrawn because of allegations of sexual abuse after repeated warnings to their battalion commander. Another low point was the capture of the eastern city of Goma by the rebel M23 group in 2012, which resulted in the creation of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) with a mandate to ‘neutralise’ armed groups. This indicated a move from peacekeeping, which is based on consent, to peacemaking, which is based on enforcement. It also led to the demise of M23.

The task of the UN force was never going to be an easy one and, in the case of MONUSCO, its primary aims have been to protect civilians and humanitarians and support the government of the DRC in its stabilisation and peace consolidation efforts. This was based on a flawed assumption that after the the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement ended the Second Congo War and with establishment of the transitional government the phase of armed violence was over and the DRC was now in a post-conflict state. Clearly, this was not the case, and the violence in the east rumbled on while the Congolese Army confronted an alphabet soup of militias, some of whom were fighting each other and supported by external parties, with the Hutu-Tutsi conflict a major factor in ensuring Rwanda’s involvement. This has put a UN force alongside the forces of the government who themselves have faced accusations of war crimes and major human rights violations. What the UN is being asked to do is fact manage numerous micro-conflicts that flare up where there is no UN presence, while at the same time dealing with major groups such as the M23 and FDLR, and at times working alongside a brutal Congolese Army prone to fracture. In effect, MONUSCO is there at the consent of a government that has no real control in the east and whose legitimacy is questioned now that the political conflict between the government and the opposition has escalated. The consequences of the latter have been seen in Kasai Central, as described last week, while the instability in the east is not helped by entrenched ethnic differences and the spoils of war to be gained from mineral deposits. It is a tragedy that in March of this year the UN Security Council voted to reduce the number of peacekeepers by 3000 while massacres continued and Central Kasai was imploding. The United States, for one, had become frustrated at the partnering of MONUSCO with a ‘corrupt government in Congo’ and the UN themselves had been the subject of protests in the east.

One problem is that the population has a mistrust of regionally sourced peacekeepers, whom they see as potentially biased, another that the country has not been effectively demilitarised. The anti-UN protests are most likely borne of frustration that the key role of protection is not being achieved and that, in some cases but not all, the protectors have themselves become exploiters. This is an ignoble outcome for a force that has in fact had a positive impact by providing some security over none and whose under-resourced troops have actively combated rebel groups such as M23. The loss of nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers in 2005 has not prevented Bangladesh from being the third largest contributor of troops to MONUSCU in 2017 (after Pakistan and India). Solutions are not easy to come by, and while military force has proven successful against large groups it is difficult to apply to militias of small size who can easily blend into the population. This requires a different approach more akin to counterinsurgency, which in turn requires effective policing and political reform, itself closer to the original aims of MONUSCU. To be clear, to really work MONUSCO needs more resources, not less, which is effectively asking the UN Security Council to provide more funds for what has become the most expensive peace operation it manages. There also needs to be a clear separation of the ‘blue helmets’ from the Congolese Army in order to engender trust. It is one thing to police by consent, another to actively fight alongside one of the participants in a conflict. Currently, MONUSCO is being asked to do ‘more with less’ when it should be asked to do ‘less with more’.

Ultimately the solutions to the crises besetting the DRC lay within the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement and commitment to an effective political transition to genuine representation. This failed spectacularly in Kasai Central and the consequences were dire in a region distant from the UN focus in the east. Peacekeeping forces are rarely equipped to rapidly deploy to another area and to stop the violence in Kasai would have required a rapid deployment capability that few countries have. It would also have been a military action of the type carried out by the British in Sierra Leone or the French in Mali, both of which were short, and were military interventions not peacekeeping. Peace in the DRC is a long way off, but it begins at the top, with President Kabila and both the government and the opposition committing to free and fair elections and accepting the results. The current situation is adding to the country’s problems, not helping them, and is risking further conflagrations and intervention from neighbouring states. The warnings that the DRC is in danger of further escalation should be heeded and pressure put on the government and opposition to work together. It is long term political reform that will bring the peace for the people of the DRC and a MONUSCO with a clearly defined mission and adequate support will help this, but is not in itself the solution.

Next week: The Africa series, a review.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/monuc/

https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-39456884

https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/democratic-republic-of-congo/52244-problematic-peacekeeping-in-the-drc-from-monuc-to-monusco.html

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/30/congo-un-peacekeepers-problem

https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/drc-to-withdraw-un-peacekeepers-accused-of-misconduct-20170620

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

There has been violence in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since the signing of a peace agreement in 2002 and establishment of a transitional government brought to an end the Second Congo War in 2003. Generally this has been a pattern of repeated occurrences of small scale violence, which collectively have the impact of a major armed conflict. The root causes of the violence, which is mostly directed at civilians, but also involves the targeting of rival groups, government forces and the UN, are the same as those that drove the two major wars of 1996-1997 and 1998-2003, namely: ethnic differences, the wealth to be exploited from mineral resources, and a continuing political crisis at the national level. Foreign actors, whether neighbouring countries such as Rwanda and Uganda, or the armed groups that operate from within them, have a major influence on the violence within the DRC and suffer from the consequences in turn. This is frequently the case in regional conflict complexes, where ethnic groups straddle borders, refugees move back and forth, and conflict in one country can easily cross borders. One example of this is the Hutu-Tutsi conflict, which reached its peak in the 1994 genocide, and has been a major contributor to political violence in the DRC. Both Rwanda and Uganda were heavily involved in the DRC’s two wars, with Rwanda seeking to counter cross border incursions by Hutu groups, wipe out the genocidaires and support Tutsi rebels in a region that all seek to exploit for its rich mineral resources.

The east of the DRC is the locus of ethnic conflict in the DRC and is a dangerous place for all. In 2005 the UN responded in force when nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers were killed by a militia group. In 2008 the Congolese Army clashed with Hutu rebels, causing thousands to flee and in 2009 a joint Congolese-Rwandan operation targeted Tutsi rebels for five weeks. These are few of many instances where militias have fought either government forces or the UN and where alliances shift, armed groups splinter, and new ones emerge. A snapshot of the rebel groups in North and South Kivu alone was provided by the BBC in 2012 and cited the existence of 25 rebel factions, noting that it would have been out of date when it was published. The groups vary in size and capability, but even the smaller ones are capable of giving the Congolese Army or the UN a hard time and they are certainly capable of destroying a village or holding sway over mineral resources. They vary from Hutu Rwandan rebels of the FDLR, the Rai Mutomboki, which are ostensibly an anti-FDLR group, the Tutsi M23, to the numerous Mai Mai groups, which claim to be self-defence groups and the ADF-NALU, whom are Ugandan led Islamists. The M23 emerged in 2012 and are mutineers from the Congolese Army, at one point numbering between 1500 and 2000 fighters, while the allied  Rai Mutomboki emerged in 2005 in response to massacres committed by the Hutu FDLP, which itself has splintered in factions. The rebel groups and militias, and the Congolese Army also, are responsible for human rights violations that increased dramatically in 2015, with reports of sexual violence, massacres and ethnic cleansing. The situation in North and South Kivu is hideously complex with shifting alliances and agendas, and with warlords exploiting the situation for both political and economic gain. Removing one group or militia from the picture through defeat or negotiation barely changes the situation at all in regions where the rewards of possessing or controlling access to natural resources can be gained at the point of a gun.

Yet, it is the recent turmoil emerging from the Kasai province that has brought the potential for a further spread of violence to light. The Kawawina Nsapu rebellion began for political reasons, yet quickly degenerated to ethnic cleansing in what is considered an opposition stronghold. It is in Kasai Central that two UN investigators and their interpreter were murdered in March and while the government has pointed the finger of blame in the direction of a militia, there is doubt as to who actually carried out the killings. The UN claims to have found eighty mass grave sites in the region and since August 2014 1.4 million people have fled the region. War crimes have been attributed to the militias, the Kawawina Nsapu, and an overwhelmingly brutal response by government forces, the last of which has been denied by the government. While the ethnic violence and banditry in the east has been an ongoing source of violence Kasai Central had been stable. It is here that regional politics has twinned with a national political crisis, which has then transitioned quickly to one involving severe inter-ethnic violence but with the underlying political dispute the driving force behind the escalation. The focus of the violence is one that is all too familiar: the government forces, their rivals, and the militias incur casualties, yet the majority of the victims are civilians who are targeted due to their political or ethnic identification with the warring parties. They are left with little choice but to either flee or be brutalised and killed.

The crisis in Kasai Central has sparked fears of a return to a wider civil war while the question of democratic succession remains unresolved.  The Global and All-Inclusive Agreement that ended the Second Congo War was based on the idea of effective political representation but the incumbent President is reluctant to give up power. There is a potential for even wider escalation into a countrywide civil war, which in turn may draw in neighbouring countries. As it stands there is the all too familiar pattern of localised conflicts in which villages and towns are decimated or wiped out and the forces of the government are unable to contain the violence and are accused of being heavily involved in it. This leaves the population dependent on a UN force that is, unsurprisingly, of insufficient size.

Next week: Peacekeeping and peacemaking in the DRC.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://theweek.com/articles/711748/congos-forgotten-war

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20586792

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/democratic-republic-of-congo-a-case-of-recurring-obstacles

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/30/congo-violence-fuels-fears-of-return-to-90s-bloodbath

http://www.irinnews.org/report/99037/briefing-armed-groups-eastern-drc

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

Generally this blog focuses on ongoing conflicts and the military history of a country or region prior to the conflict is addressed only in terms of its context in relation to current events. Here we will break with this focus and address the two wars that centred on the country now known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and which took place between 1996-1997 and 1998-2003. The second is known as ‘Africa’s World War’, an apt description for a period of violence that drew in nations from across Africa, although the fighting took place almost entirely within the borders of the DRC. The majority of the casualties resulting from this were civilians with the number of excess deaths due to the conflict ranging from a lower estimate of one million to an upper estimate of over seven million. The commonly accepted death toll is 5.4 million people.

In 1996, the DRC was known as Zaire and was already in serious trouble. Its military ruler, President Mobuto Sese Seko, had held power for almost thirty years and was under pressure to democratise the country. There were severe ethnic tensions and in 1991 he had agreed to form a coalition government with opposition leaders, but this did not defuse the situation. In the volatile east of the country ethnic Tutsis, the Banyamulenge, were under threat from other ethnic groups and had aligned themselves with the Rwanda Patriotic Forces (RPF) and in the wake of the Rwandan Civil War and Genocide both Tutsis and Hutus fled to Zaire. These included the Hutu Interahamwe, whom had participated in the genocide, and they began attacking Tutsis and launched attacks into Rwanda. With Mobuto unable to maintain effective control in the east Rwanda launched a military incursion in support of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL), a coalition of rebel groups in Zaire opposed to Mobuto and led by a non-Tutsi, Laurent-Desire Kabila. Regional rivalries and alliances meant that the ensuing civil war drew in Burundi and Angola alongside Rwanda and Uganda in support of the AFDL. Angola, for example, became involved due to Mobutu’s support for UNITA, an Angolan separatist group who joined the fray in support of Mobutu. Other countries also provided support for the combatants. The war ended after the AFDL crossed the country and took the capital, Kinshasa. Kabila took charge and renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

None of this resolved the tensions in the east, and Kabila’s attempts to centralise the DRC brought him into conflict with ethnic groups in the east. He also ordered the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan forces despite having little control in the east, alarming the Banyamulenge, who then mutinied, and with Rwandan and Ugandan backing the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) emerged as a potent opposition force. By 1999 an RCD offensive had advanced towards Kinshasa and Kabila’s government survived only due to military intervention by Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Sudan, the Central African Republic and Libya. Political support was also provided by South Africa, Zambia and Tanzania. From then on the fighting was predominantly undertaken by proxies and militias emerged defined by their support or opposition to the government, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Angola. In 1999 six of the warring nations agreed to a ceasefire and committed to disarming the myriad armed groups operating within the DRC (which they failed to do) and the UN deployed a peacekeeping mission (MONUC). In 2000, Kabila was assassinated and succeeded by his son, Joseph, who was sworn in as President. He began to stabilise the western part of the country, and with intra-RCD fighting and the support of Rwanda and Uganda for the rebels diminishing, peace talks in South Africa resulted in the Sun City Agreement. This committed Kabila to a framework for achieving multi-party elections. In 2002 both Rwanda and Uganda had signed peace agreements and in December 2002 the government, opposition parties, and major rebel groups, including the RCD factions, the Ugandan backed MLA and the Mai Mai, signed the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement. This came into effect in July 2003 and marked the end of the Second Congo War, but violence continued in the east, where the government had weak control.

The Congo Wars had their roots in the ethnic tensions in the east of the DRC and both Rwanda and Uganda provided support to the rebels. The overall political situation in the DRC had improved but violence persisted in regions such as North and South Kivu and a new conflict has emerged in the southern Kasai province. While the country has been in a state of comparative peace, central control remains weak and the DRC is reliant on the current UN mission. One aspect that has not been described above is systematic human rights violations by government forces, rebels, and the myriad militias that have sprung up as a consequence of the 1998-2003 war. Akin to other conflicts covered in this blog these include sexual violence, the recruitment of child soldiers and accusations of ethnic cleansing. While the two Congo wars drew in the national armed forces of neighbouring countries the majority of the fighting has been undertaken by the government, rebel groups such as the RCD, and smaller militias with little or no accountability.

Next week: The current phase of violence.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13286306

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/34958903/ns/world_news-africa/t/review-congo-war-halves-death-toll/#.WfRODdQrKt8

http://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict

http://www.economist.com/node/1213296

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

This and the following blogs on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continue the series on conflicts in Africa. Thus far these have covered Somalia, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic. In recent African history the DRC holds an ignoble status as the locus of what has been termed ‘Africa’s World War’, a conflagration whose casualties are still disputed. Located in Central Africa, the DRC is a huge country of over 78 million people covering an area that would encompass two-thirds of Western Europe, and dwarfing Belgium, the former colonial power. While the DRC is a tropical country it also has substantial mineral resources including diamonds and cobalt, which is essential for lithium-ion batteries, and coltan, which is used in electronics such as smartphones. Given its size and location, it is no great surprise that there is a large number of neighbouring countries: the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola and the Republic of the Congo. While, a sliver of land links the country to the Atlantic the DRC is mostly landlocked. The current UN force in the DRC is MONUSCO, which replaced MONUC in 2010.

A critical year for the DRC was 2003, when the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement effectively ended the Second Congo War (1998-2003). Since then violence has persisted mainly in the eastern part of the country and is centered round ethnic differences, the wealth to be exploited from mineral resources, and unresolved issues from the civil wars. Neighbouring countries are also believed to have a hand in sustaining the more than seventy armed groups active in the DRC. The largely forgotten continuing violence resulted in the largest population displacement globally in 2016 of 922,000 people, larger than those occurring in Syria, Iraq, and Nigeria. An estimated one million people have been displaced in 2017, a figure likely to exceed that of the Rohingya of Myanmar, who have been driven out by a campaign of ethnic cleansing. Compounding this humanitarian crisis are refugees from the fighting in South Sudan.

Understanding the current violence requires an introduction to the First and Second Congo wars, which we will cover in the next blog, but two areas currently stand out as conflict prone, the Kawawina Nsapu rebellion centered on the Kasai provinces and the continuing Kivu conflict, one of many that have affected the unstable eastern part of the DRC. There are also concerns over rising political tensions between the government and opposition parties, with the risk of a new nationwide civil war.  The Kawawina Nsapu rebellion escalated at the end of 2016 and the conflict between Kawawina Nsapu militia and the government and their local Banja Mura allies has degenerated into ethnic cleansing of the Luba people, from which the Kawawina Nsapu militia recruits, and also the Lulua . In turn, the loosely formed and leaderless Kawawina Nsapu militia has targeted the Pende and Tchokwe peoples. Government forces have been accused of participating in ethnic violence on behalf of their local allies. This is a relatively new conflict and has emerged from a political dispute over governance to one where ethnic violence is rife in a region that was previously peaceful. The conflict in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu is much older, with a new phase of violence beginning in 2015. This area has an abundance of armed groups, with some operating out of neighbouring countries such as Burundi, and including the M23, who briefly held the city of Goma until they withdrew after negotiation. In this area, the UN force is authorised to carry out offensive operations, with or without DRC forces. The fighting beginning in 2015 has seen the UN forces targeted, government offensives, and infighting between what has been described as an ‘alphabet soup’ of rebel groups, whose alliances shift. The eastern part of the DRC, which includes the Kivu provinces, has a high population density, significant mineral resources, and ethnic heterogeneity, all of which has been a challenge to peacemaking and compounded by the interference of neighbours such as Rwanda and Burundi.

Next week: The Congo Wars

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco

http://www.africanews.com/2017/05/22/dr-congo-has-world-s-highest-population-fleeing-conflict//

http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/07/31/briefing-conflict-kasai-drc

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/congo-massacres-ethnic-conflict-250-people-killed-m-united-nations-crimes-humanity-civil-war-a7876266.html

http://africanarguments.org/2017/05/15/dont-look-away-now-dr-congo-is-at-greatest-risk-than-for-years/

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

The conflict in Ukraine over the Donbass region lumbers on, generally unnoticed unless there is a spike in the violence, as was the case earlier this year with Avdiivka. While this is clearly a battle over the future status of the Donbass region in the east and there is a genuine will amongst the separatist leaders for independence, the influencing hand of Putin’s Russia is also unmistakably present. The ceasefire agreement from the Minsk II talks exists in name only and the protagonists continue to fight on across fixed lines. Despite consistent denials from the Kremlin of Russian involvement the United States, Canada and the EU are sufficiently convinced of this that sanctions still remain in place. These date back to the annexation of Crimea in 2014, a territory that is considered to be lost to Ukraine.

Ukraine had problems with corruption and effective representation that remain to be resolved as wars seldom resolve underlying differences and generally solidify and entrench opposing views. This means that the root cause of internal political problems remains as strong as ever but any chance of resolving them through negotiation is hamstrung while an outside power maintains an influence. Ukraine’s deadlocked civil war will not be resolved either by the separatist east being propped up by Russia, nor by a government victory over the rebels. Much of what can be achieved in the future is in the hands of the Kremlin, whose hand in exploiting discontent in eastern Ukraine has been blatant, and from where contradictory signals have been sent. On the one hand there has been a major joint exercise with Belarusian forces, on the other an acknowledgement that UN troops could be deployed in eastern Ukraine alongside the existing OSCE monitors. The first can be read as a wider message to the West of the renewed capability of reformed armed forces, the second as a concession that the situation in Donbass is proving detrimental to Russia in economic, political and military terms. These tie in with Russia’s investment in the Assad regime in Syria, which has also drawn sanctions and where Russian military capability is also being demonstrated. Behind this is geopolitics and if the message being sent by the Kremlin is not clear then it should be: Russian security and prestige is the priority and everything else is secondary.

This message had been delivered clearly in 2008 when Russian forces entered Georgia and put a stop to any consideration of Georgia joining the EU. While no responsible power should cave in to force they should at least read the signals that have been sent. There are strict criteria for EU membership, which neither of Georgia or the Ukraine met, and the question of EU membership was a divisive issue in Ukraine at the time of the Euromaiden revolution. From the Russian perspective, both the EU and NATO were encroaching steadily towards Russian borders and even absorbing countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union. That this was occurring because of previous Russian dominance and the security that NATO membership offers was a message that Putin’s Russia either failed to hear, or chose to ignore. This may be because their sphere of influence was under threat from the military alliance of NATO and the socio-economic power of the EU, both of whom were expanding aggressively, with the potential for the ill-qualified Ukraine joining either the final straw. If it looks like a new Cold War then that is because it is either part of a new global rivalry or unfinished business from the Cold War that was supposed to have finished in 1989. Whichever is the case, the outcome bears a striking resemblance to the proxy wars that were present throughout a Cold War that saw a lot of fighting but in which the two main protagonists managed to avoid fighting each other. Throughout Asia, Africa and Central America, the Cold War was decidedly hot. If this smacks of the power relations of global politics and international rivalries then it should, for this is a world where two nations still retain vast stocks of the most abhorrent and unusable weapons invented.

So where does this leave Ukraine? To be clear, Ukraine had its own internal problems, but these would not have led to armed conflict without outside involvement, for which there is a strong argument that the Kremlin holds responsibility. The border between Ukraine and Russia is a porous one and in name only, and the separatists are backed by Russia. Understanding the geopolitical pressures does not excuse the supporting of insurgency or interference in a neighbouring country, a contagion which is far from limited to Russia. Yet, the current state of the geopolitical rivalry in Eastern Europe is fundamentally unnecessary and detrimental to all. It is also dangerous and driven by fear. The EU is right to stand up to such aggression, but it also needs to work alongside the US in defusing the current rivalry and engage proactively with Russia. This starts with halting the violence in Ukraine and if both sides can be persuaded to stop fighting and be provided with truly impartial mediators without a predetermined political outcome in mind there will be a pathway out. The political damage that has already been done cannot be repaired, but it can be mitigated. The separatists are unlikely to want the forces of the Ukrainian government in their territory and the provision of UN troops would allow the re-establishment of normality to the areas of fighting, meaning that it would not be necessary to provide troops for the entirety of the disputed Donbass region. Of the armed conflicts in the world today, that in Ukraine is amongst the most accessible to UN intervention and could prove to be one of the shortest. Peace in the Ukraine is both possible and overdue.

Next week we return to our series on African conflicts with a focus on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21730

http://www.osce.org/ukrainecrisis

https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/conflict-in-ukraine

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-ukraine-conflict-ceasefire-vladimir-putin-un-peacekeeping-a7941016.html

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

Kurdish territories in Syria and Iraq have expanded dramatically as a consequence of wars forced upon the Kurds and they have demonstrated a knack for both political representation and the participation of women in political and military affairs. This is a far cry from their status under the Syria of Hafez al-Assad, where they were barely recognised, and the brutality of their repression in Iraq during the time of Saddam Hussein, who gassed them. Kurdish fortunes in Iran and Turkey are not much better, with an on-off insurgency in Iran barely heard of and the PKK insurgency in Turkey rarely making it into the headlines of the mainstream western media. The latter had de-escalated but reignited in 2015 and relations between the Kurds and Turks deteriorated further after the failed coup in Turkey brought an immediate crackdown on all the opponents of the government.

The separatist Turkish PKK is designated as a terrorist organisation by the EU and the US, yet the Syrian YPG and Iraqi wing of the PKK are important allies to the West. During the Iran-Iraq war both sides were happy to encourage the Kurds in the other country to take up arms. Much as the colonial powers of the early Twentieth Century were happy to promise the Arab tribes nations but then hang onto them through mandates, the contemporary regional powers have little trouble in recognising the Kurds as a people but do not want to see a Kurdistan emerge in any country, less territory be carved off from their own countries. The international powers are little better and are notably reticent over acknowledging Kurdish calls for autonomy and independence. They had also said little when chemical warfare was used against the Kurds in Iraq prior until Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait turned the international community against him and the plight of the Kurds in Iraq was recognised by the UN in 1991.  Campaigning for the Kurds is limited, as is often the case in such situations, to the Kurds themselves, human rights groups, journalists, and earnest activists.

Much of the resistance to Kurdish independence is emanating from Ankara, Baghdad, and Tehran, whom have manoeuvred in an aggressive manner politically and the movement of ground forces has already begun. Ankara has also sent its forces into Syria’s Irbil region, ostensibly to impose a de-escalation zone agreed by Iran, Russia and Turkey as an outcome of the Astana Talks over Syria. A more driving goal is likely to be the determination not to have a contiguous Kurdish border between Turkey and Syria. Ankara does not distinguish between the PKK in Turkey and Iraq and the YPG in Syria, so is also concerned with developments in Iraq. Here the Iraqi government has a weak hold of the country and has been dependent on the Kurds, Iranian backed militias and the US led coalition during its war against ISIS. For its part, Damascus has been receptive to the idea of Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria but is unlikely to make any concrete commitment while the Syrian War continues and there may well be a change of mood should the regime be freed up from its battles elsewhere.

This is a short review, but even the uninitiated in Middle-East politics or conflict analysis will see the storm on the horizon. Syria’s ordeal is rightly acknowledged as hideously complex, while Iraq has seen its own sectarian civil war, and both have been in the frontline of an overlapping war against ISIS. A declaration of Kurdish independence in Iraq is highly likely to provoke a military response that will result in an additional conflagration that neither of the Kurds or Iraq need. This is in addition to the existing Turkey-Kurdish conflict that has resulted in a reported 3,132 casualties since July 2015 alone. Nor can the possibility of a trans-border war across Iraqi, Syrian, and Turkish territories be ruled out. This is a worst-case scenario that does not need to happen and is avoidable but requires cool heads dedicated to the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question, and which still awaits an answer. It is not simply political and economic interests that gives the democrats of the West pause for thought but also the fear of what it will cost the Kurds and its impact on an Iraq that some argue is heading towards disintegration.

Nevertheless, the wishes of the Kurds in Iraq and Syria are unmistakable and the argument that this is not a good time is one that could have been applied many times before and raises the question: ‘If not now, then when?’ The Kurds in Iraq and Syria have reached a position of autonomy previously unseen and are able to maintain functioning governments at the same time as fighting on the ground. They have been backed by the US led coalition in their wars against ISIS and, in the case of the Iraqi Kurds, have fought at the behest of a government that now says it is ready to battle them. While there is a hope that the messages emanating from Ankara and Baghdad in particular are bluster and will not be backed by force, the history of the Kurdish struggles for independence suggests otherwise.

There is one thing that the West in particular can do immediately in order to prevent an unnecessary war that no one wants but all seem willing to fight, which is to wield its diplomatic prowess in its full force and maintain it as the situation develops. This would involve the EU and its individual political powerhouses (which include France, Germany, and the UK), the United States and Canada, and Western influence in the UN Security Council. This should be accompanied by mediation and negotiation as a preventative measure without a predetermined outcome towards Kurdish independence, but as a channel though which it can be discussed. Ultimately, the recognition of an independent Kurdish state is the responsibility of the United Nations as an organisation encompassing all countries, not simply those which are the most powerful or occupy UNSC seats.

Next week: Ukraine

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/18/world/kurdish-people-fast-facts/index.html

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/29/kurdish-freedom-referendum-iraq

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/turkish-troops-enter-northern-syria-operation-171013001304475.html

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-kurds/damascus-says-syrian-kurdish-autonomy-negotiable-report-idUSKCN1C10TJ

http://www.crisisgroup.be/interactives/turkey/

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

The Kurd’s were early victims of the Anglo-French carve up of the Middle East into mandates, which segued into sponsored nations, then independent nations with flags and borders and a jumble of nationalities and ethnicities sprawled across and within them. When all is well and there is prosperity and security, and most importantly, recognition and representation, different ethnic groups will coexist and even work together as a nation-state. The modern leaders of the hastily constructed nation-states did not do this, however, and settled for oppression and brutal repression whenever separatism or discontent emerged, and in a manner that would make even their former colonial masters blanch and balk. Nor has the inconsistent approach and interventions of the global powers helped, or for that matter, regional rivalries that fuel local violence. The latter has manifested itself in Yemen, but both regional and global concerns loom over Syria and Iraq, and it is here that the Kurdish quest for independence is making clear and definable progress. There are some 30 million Kurds living in a near contiguous region that covers parts of Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, and when referendums are held there is an overwhelming desire for autonomy or independence, the future Kurdish state would be viable, and the collective identity of the Kurds is undeniable. The case for independence, which should never simply be an automatic right, is strong and compelling, but unheeded.

So, why is the resistance to an independent Kurdish state so strong? This is understandable in the four countries that the Kurds inhabit. Turkey and Iran are strong nation-states, while Syria and Iraq are bordering on outright failure, but few nations in history have voluntarily given up territory or control over it. To do so makes the central state less powerful and decreases the resources available to it, and brings with it further cries for independence. In national and international politics cold pragmatism will trump passionate idealism easily as the leaders of nations have the responsibility to all their people, not only the ones that want to break away. It is less understandable further afield where the consequences of independence are not so keenly felt. The US exists because of a battle for independence and slowly forced the European colonialists to embrace self-determination, beginning at Versailles. The British have come to embrace self-determination as a doctrine in their national politics, applying it to the Falklands and Northern Ireland and along with the French, learned the value of self-determination the hard way. The EU has enabled the spread of autonomy within Europe and has accepted newly independent countries into its ranks. For their part, Russia has experienced the dismantling of the Soviet Union and formed new relationships with the former Soviet states, while struggling with calls for independence within its own borders. Less this be seen as a rosy review of the US, UK, France and Russia, their conduct in international affairs is a mixed bag of good and harm, but the point remains: the principle of self-determination, also embraced by the UN, is an accepted part of international relations.

Yet the resistance to Kurdish independence remains, despite the strong claim, and the precedents already seen regarding autonomy and independence, the US, UK, France, Russia and the EU, are all decidedly lukewarm towards the idea of Kurdish independence. They have resisted the call for decades, overlooked Saddam’s atrocities until it became pertinent to do so, and now that the Kurd’s have contributed in blood to the demise of ISIS, and are holding referendums in Syria and Iraq, seem to be secretly wishing that it wasn’t happening.

This is a poor reward given the sacrifices made towards the stopping of the ISIS advances in Syria and Iraq and indicates international concern over the future of the two countries as cohesive nation-states and the implications of Kurdish independence in either state for Turkey and Iran. The pragmatists are winning the idealists losing due to the fear that the unfinished wars in Iraq and Syria will have wider implications than has so far been the case. The question they are asking is not over the Kurdish right to independence, it is about what might happen if an independent Kurdistan emerges from the within either Iraq or Syria and what the countries in the region will do about it.

Next week: Regional relationships and implications.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

https://www.cfr.org/interactives/time-kurds#!/?cid=soc-at-the_time_of_the_kurds-infoguide

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/iraqi-kurdish-independence-criteria-by-richard-n–haass-2017-09

http://www.merip.org/mer/mer189/kurdish-experience

http://www.aljazeera.com/topics/people/kurds.html

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/russia-syria-iraq-kurds-quest-autonomy.html

http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/040820171

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

The future of ISIS and their self-declared caliphate is currently being decided on the battlefields of Syria’s War while the Iraqi’s finish mopping up the remnants of resistance in Iraq. The end of ISIS’s hold on a trans-state territory carved from Iraq and Syria is close and the conclusion is not in doubt: the caliphate will cease to exist as a physical entity, not forgetting that no reputable Islamic authority outside of the Salafi-Jihadists recognised it in the first place. While it will remain as a diminished insurgency and inspiration for terrorism, ISIS has gone the way that militarised totalitarian regimes generally go: into crushing defeat at the hands of the many that they have chosen to label as unbelievers, who they were content to persecute and fight. The end may seem quick but it has in fact taken over three years so far, the final defeat is to come, and the conditions for a resurgence remain.

The range of opponents responsible for the ISIS endgame are many and make up a eclectic list of countries and sub-state actors who, frankly, do not get along and have postponed their own quarrels in order to defeat what constituted a major threat to peace in the region. The Iraqi Kurds and both Sunni and Shia militias had a hand in forestalling the 2014 advance in Iraq, and joined the Iraqi forces and the US coalition in defeating ISIS in Iraq. In Syria, the Kurd’s stood firm at Rojava, backed by coalition airpower, and then combined with Arab forces as the SDF to advance into Raqqa, the ISIS capital. The Syrian Arab Army and their Shia allies have advanced quickly eastwards with backing from Russian airpower and are competing with US backed forces to take the Deir ez-Zor governorate. Behind the Syrians, the various Shia militias and Hezbollah stands the regional power of Iran, who has invested heavily in the Assad regime. Behind the myriad Syrian Opposition groups, who also fought ISIS, stands the other regional power, Saudi Arabia.

The defeat of ISIS will be welcome to all but those who fall for their slick propaganda but it will leave the other parties involved in the Syrian War free to resolve the question of who rules Syria and what the borders of a future Syria will be. The problem here that is that all the parties fighting on the ground have expended enough blood to stain the land for years and are unlikely to give up their gains easily. Alliances formed to defeat ISIS are unlikely to hold without a common enemy to fight and divisions will likely re-emerge. Two stand out immediately as a risk.

The first is the success of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in defeating Ahrar al-Sham and other opponents in Idlib province in northern Syria. HTS is dominated by the former al-Qaeda affiliate the Al-Nusra Front, and its renaming appears to be aimed at avoiding the attentions of the US by presenting an image more Islamist than Jihadist. Its actions in Idlib province indicate otherwise as it has systematically defeated it enemies and enforced its rule in a Jihadist fashion. On the spectrum of Opposition groups HTS is at one end and the moderate Free Syrian Army is at the other. While there are still battles going on between the Government and Opposition groups elsewhere, HTS represents the most potent claim to territory from within the Opposition. The Government has already shifted its attention northward and is likely to launch a major offensive backed by Russian air power to retake the territory. HTS will stand and fight, meaning that the battle has the potential be one of the worst the country has seen.

The second is the forthcoming defeat of ISIS by the SDF and occupation of Raqqa, which has its own dangers. The SDF is a fragile alliance of Kurds and Arabs (not forgetting other minorities) and the deployment of US forces on the ground in Syria was for two reasons. The first was to provide artillery support for the advance into Raqqa, the second was to ensure that the Kurds and Arabs did not fall out amongst themselves and that the Turkish forces advancing into Syria at the time did not end up fighting the Kurds. The US solution was a risky one of placing themselves between the protagonists, which has prevented a major escalation for now. It didn’t stop Turks, Kurds and Arabs from skirmishing with each other. The circumstances will change should the Kurdish dominated SDF take control of the Arab city of Raqqa and there will be calls for their withdrawal. A pragmatic move for the Kurds would be to withdraw and consolidate their hold of their territory elsewhere. This is not guaranteed to happen and if it did, who would take control firmly enough to ensure that an ISIS revival did not occur? There is also the question of the political developments in Syrian territory where the Kurds are becoming more assertive under the watchful eyes of Turkey, who have their own intra-state battle with the Kurdish PKK, and do not distinguish between them and the YPG battling for Raqqa.

None of this is encouraging in terms of resolutions being found within the complexities of Syria’s war. ISIS will survive in a diminished form and without stability in eastern Syria there will always be a chance of a revival in its fortunes. The battle for Idlib province has already begun and while there will be the usual justifiable but unheeded howls of protest at the plight of the civilians caught up in the violence, few will care about what happens to HTS. The Kurds are another matter altogether.

The question of the status of the Kurds in the Middle East is one that affects Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, with political developments in Syria and Iraq bringing this to the fore. Next week we will take a closer look at the Kurdish question.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/isis-mosul-iraq-defeated-remain-a-deadly-force-a7817116.html

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/08/syria-idlib-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-agreements.html

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/24/kurds-see-historic-chance-advance-cause-ruins-islamic-state

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/the-times/fears-for-syrias-future-after-the-fall-of-raqqa/news-story/949a9970165ae25fc5611902f775278f

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

The Central African Republic (CAR) is a country that needs stability and prospects for its people in order to pull itself out of the bloody mire that it is in today. This is not an easy task for a government, which despite having an elected President, struggles to govern the capital, Bangui, never mind the rest of the country. Not having a functioning army does not help and high up on the ‘to do’ list is to start from scratch and build one untainted by the war crimes committed when the Seleka insurgency began in 2012. The military was largely demobilised by the victorious Seleka, who were themselves disbanded after their own murderous time in the ascendancy, and international sanctions prevent what is left of it from being rearmed. As a consequence, security is reliant on international peacekeepers, whether from the African Union, United Nations, or France, the former colonial power. They have been having a hard time of it, as the militias that operate in the CAR are not shy of killing off the peacekeepers, or the civilians and aid workers they try to protect. In the long term the CAR needs a national army worthy of serving a country and its people. They are unlikely to get one.

The harsh reality is that parts of the CAR are bandit country, in particular where there is profit to be had from the exploitation of natural resources, and people with no prospects in sight will be drawn to serving warlords if this is the only way to make a living. There are other, more noble reasons to pick up a gun, notably if ones family or home is at risk and there is only one way to protect them. It is not hard to imagine how easily self-defence becomes destroying anyone or anything perceived as threat, including those nearby who are different and belong to another ethnic group.

The violence has continued, although the participants and the nature of the violence have changed, despite there being no shortage of ceasefires and agreements in what can loosely be described as a peace process since the latest war began in 2012. The latest in June this year, between the Government and rebel groups, committed to giving political representation to the armed groups in exchange for an end to attacks and roadblocks. This may seem like rewarding violence, but it is also a pragmatic way forward when there is no provision for security. It is also a further step in the direction of political participation, which in turn means representation. Removing roadblocks allows for the free movement of aid and trade, both of which are needed as the building blocks of a functioning state able to meet the needs of its people. The CAR is resource rich and there should be no shortage of food, but opportunism and violence has left people both poor and hungry.

There has also been a regular commitment of peacekeepers to the CAR dating back to 1996. The current UN force in the CAR is MINUSCA, which evolved from an AU force (MISCA), when the UN commitment to the CAR was stepped up in 2014. This stands at 10,000 and the UN is asking for more as US forces hunting the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have left. This needs to be put in perspective: the US troops were special forces dealing with a specific threat, and not peacekeepers, who operate under a UN mandate and try to avoid fighting, seeking to provide protection. 10,000 troops is actually an utterly inadequate number to provide security to the people of the CAR, even in the south-east alone, which is the current focus of the fighting. It takes more troops to police a country than it does to invade one, and the UN peacekeepers are present by consent and work to prevent violence, not to join in. They are also likely to be poorly resourced, with nations willing to commit troops to the UN so long as somebody else is helping to pay the bills.

Peace in the CAR will only be achieved in the long run by continuing the long and unsung process of talking and bringing together opposing groups while at the same time providing security. In the long term this will only be provided by a functioning army, police and effective border controls, and it is this that the international community needs to work towards to avoid all its other efforts being wasted. This means the rebuilding of the CAR’s forces to support the UN and work towards taking over its role entirely. A surge in the deployment of peacekeepers will pay dividends in the long run, so long as they are given free rein to hit the opportunists and foreign fighters hard when needed. They will still need to continue with the essential core duties of peacekeeping, namely, talking, negotiating and liaising as they are not there to fight a war, but to protect life. This begins with the peacekeepers themselves: combatants should be in no doubt that the UN is there to keep the peace, but at the same time be clear that killing them will carry a heavy penalty. This carries with it the caveat of accountability in that the peacemakers will be held accountable for their actions.

Next week we return to Syria and ISIS.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/central-african-republic.php?page=all&print=true

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/car-government-signs-peace-deal-rebel-groups-170619175516668.html

http://yaounde.sites.unicnetwork.org/2017/08/01/un-peacekeeping-chief-on-the-dire-situation-in-the-central-african-republic/

http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/un-seeks-more-peacekeepers-for-central-african-republic-20170916

https://theowp.org/reports/civil-war-in-the-central-african-republic-not-just-a-national-crisis/

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator