Conflict Analysis and Resolution Information Services

One viewpoint of the origins of the current violence in Libya is that it is a result of the competing political tensions in post-Gaddafi Libya of Centrists, Liberals and Islamists in the General National Congress, which was disbanded in 2014. In this respect it related to the question of the constitution of the future governance of Libya, in particular the degree to which this governance should be Islamist in nature. This places the conflict into the context of competing visions of the type of governance, although we should note that labels such as ‘Liberal’ and ‘Centrist’ are generalisations of political stances, and have unique applications for Libya and a more reductive, simpler, description would be of Nationalists and Islamists. Another view, one more cynical but equally plausible, is that the conflict is a scramble for power and wealth as rivals adjust to a post-revolutionary Libya where power and wealth are up for grabs. Both of these viewpoints point to a failure to craft a new social contract that is fair and equitable to all Libyans while accommodating entrenched political and religious positions.

The subsequent escalation into civil war resulted in a situation whereby there were three governments and associated fighting forces vying for military dominance in Libya while at the same time pursuing a negotiated political solution. There was also the emergence of other actors, amongst these the Jihadists (which included ISIS). It is tempting to view the conflict in terms of the current rivalry between the democratically elected Council of Deputies (CoD), also known as the ‘Tobruk Government’ or ‘House of Representatives’ (HoR), and the rival General National Congress (GNC), but this fails to convey the various interests at play. These include the Zintani Brigades, the Misrata Brigades, the Petroleum Facilities Guard, Tuareg and Toubou militias, which have allied with either side but have their own distinctive interests, and the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC), the Derna Mujahideen Shura Council (DMSC) and ISIS. The military situation of the CoD and GNC rivals at the national level are determined by the support of their allied armed groups and militias, as well as the fortunes of the fiercely independent and distinctly Islamist BSRC and the Jihadists. The third government is the Tripoli based the Government of National Salvation. There is an international dimension to the conflict, with Egypt and the UAE backing the CoD and Qatar and Turkey backing the GNS, and the United States targeting ISIS.

There is a strong argument to made that there are no genuine national level actors in Libya but instead competing governments seeking the backing of a myriad of actors at the regional and local level whom make alliances with the ‘governments’ on the basis of their own interests. In the course of the war these have sometimes changed sides or formed alliances that were temporary and have broken down. The situation is more one of armed groups, ‘city states’, tribes such as the Tuareg (significant territory holders in the south-west) and distinctly Jihadist actors such as ISIS. The continuing failure to reach a political solution at the national level and the lack of a national force to provide security ensures that loyalty to armed groups and the tribes and militias of the city states continues. It also generates a security vacuum outside of the areas where the forces of the competing interests hold sway. Without a general state of peace and security the towns and cities are forced to pursue their own path to security and prosperity. These factors combine to prevent the formation of a national government that will tackle the socio-economic problems affecting the population and which will not be resolved while a Nationalist versus Islamist political situation continues at the national level of politics.

Despite the severe obstacles towards achieving a peaceful solution to Libya’s war, there has been some progress, including the formation of a UN supported ‘unity government’ in 2016. This will be discussed in the next blog.

Next week: Mediation and Negotiation

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/29/-sp-briefing-war-in-libya

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/06/01/does-the-road-to-stability-in-libya-pass-through-cairo/

http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/mapping_libya_conflict

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator.

Amongst the countries that experienced the Arab Spring Libya is unique in that it was the only country where the West intervened militarily and provided the support for the rebels against a country’s leader. Of all the leaders challenged by Arab Spring inspired uprisings Muammar Gaddafi stood out as one whom had challenged the West through support for terrorism and had sent his own security apparatus out to kill US citizens and soldiers, killing UK citizens in the process. It is little surprise that when it came to question of intervening to prevent a massacre in Benghazi the normalisation of relations between the West and Libya was quickly forgotten and the rebels backed in their offensive against Gaddafi’s forces. The aftermath of the fall of Gaddafi is the subject of this week’s blog and the events that transpired would later affect western politicians and the UN Security Council when it came to the question of intervening in Syria.

Between the end of the First Libyan Civil War that ended the Gaddafi regime in October 2011 and the beginning of the Second Libyan Civil War in May 2014 there was a period of factional violence as Libya’s politicians attempted to establish a functioning government. The National Transition Council (NTC) that was recognised internationally did not have full control of the disparate rebels whom had participated in the fall of Gaddafi. There was a variety of armed groups, some defectors from the Libyan army, Islamists, tribal groups and other militias formed in self-defence, which sought recognition and representation in post-conflict Libya. Many of these groups were reluctant to hand over their weapons and some moved on to actively asserting their position as ‘guardians of the revolution’, adopting a political stance. Put succinctly, there were too many groups, too many guns and a weak central government that could not meet the demands of all. Included within the spectrum of armed groups were Islamists and Jihadists. While the Islamists had previously had a strong presence in Libyan politics and society, the Jihadists were Al-Qaeda and ISIS linked and arose due to the declining security situation. The extent of the proliferation of armed groups is demonstrated by the estimate that by 2016 there were approximately 1,700 armed groups active in Libya.

The NTC handed power over to the newly elected General National Council (GNC) in August 2012 after a general election with 2.8 million registered voters. However, the GNC and successive governments had inherited a problem whereby some of the armed groups were on the government payroll. They had been called upon to register and unite under the Ministry of Defence but this also conferred some legitimacy to the groups. Armed groups were able to ally with political groups in order to influence the functioning of the government. After a lethal assault on the US embassy in Benghazi the government cracked down on the semi-legal militias, declaring that they should come under the authority of the government or disband. To do this they were dependent on larger militias to help them, again conferring legitimacy on independent armed groups.  By April 2013 the situation had deteriorated to the extent that the US and UK withdrew their diplomatic staff from Libya. The situation worsened with the Libyan Prime Minister briefly kidnapped in October of 2013 and Deputy Interior Minister shot dead in January 2014. This was the tip of the iceberg of a descent into political rivalry and chaos that culminated with the former Gaddafi loyalist General Khalifa Haftar launching a major military operation against Islamist militias in Benghazi. ‘Operation Dignity’ effectively marks the beginning of the Second Libyan Civil War.

The complexity of the situation in Libya in the period between the First and Second Civil wars is difficult to convey in the space of a blog and the reader is directed to the additional material below for a better understanding. The descent into violence was a result of the prevalence of independent armed groups operating in the country and the inability of a new government to disarm them and bring them into a national army. The ability of these groups to both influence politics and act criminally with near impunity fundamentally undermined the attempts of a newly emerging and fractious group of politicians divided over the future constitution of the new Libyan state. Amongst these were liberals, moderates and Islamists. The linkages between armed groups and politics and the dependence of politicians on the support of armed groups effectively crippled any attempt at constructive and inclusive politics. New democracies are notoriously vulnerable to terrorism and insurgency and Libya is a brutal and tragic example.

Next week: The Second Civil War.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2014/02/timeline-three-years-after-libya-uprising-201421691755192622.html

https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/civil-war-in-libya

https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Lybia%20A%20Short%20Guide%20to%20the%20Conflict.pdf

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator.

The Africa Series continues with a focus on Libya, which underwent a brief civil war in 2011 and has been suffering the consequences ever since with a second civil war beginning in 2014. In Part One, we look at the 2011 civil war and the period leading up to it.

In 2011 Libya had been ruled by Muammar Gaddafi for 42 years and after years of confrontation with the West and his neighbours Libya had reached a point where its international relations had been normalised. Yet, while the country seemed to be a cohesive state, there were underlying tensions internally and the improved foreign relations were only a recent development. Gaddafi had maintained power through balancing the interests of tribes, other competing demands and through outright repression when required. While there were numerous attempts at reform and the encouragement of ‘popular revolution’ there was never any question regarding Gaddafi’s position as the ‘permanent leader of the revolution’. Unlike other authoritarian states there was a distinct merging of revolutionary politics, socialism and Islam, guided by Gaddafi’s infamous ‘Green Book’. Akin to such states, any challenge to Gaddafi’s lifelong rule was comprehensively crushed. Aligned with the Soviet bloc during the Cold War the Gaddafi regime sponsored international terrorism, assassinated its opponents abroad, fought brief wars with Egypt and Chad, and challenged the West directly. Incidents such as the bombing of a Berlin nightclub packed with US soldiers, the downing of a Pan Am flight over the Scottish town of Lockerbie, and murder of a British policewoman outside the Libyan embassy ensured that, for the British and Americans at least, Libya became a pariah state. Relations were only normalised in the new century with the UN sanctions imposed after the Lockerbie bombing lifted in 2003. Throughout his rule Gaddafi faced of challengers, protesters and, in the 1990s, an Islamic resurgence though pragmatism, manipulation and brute force. Dissent had been declared illegal in 1973.

While, to the outsider, Libya’s fortunes as a country seemed to be on the up, in reality it was a fragile nation in which people were naturally more allied to local and tribal leaders than the central government. As has frequently been the case in authoritarian countries, prosperity was balanced by repression and governance depended on favours. Crucially, the government was not meeting its side of the ‘ruling bargain’ and dissent was able to spread through social media. When protests were brutally put down again in 2011 the situation escalated quickly into a rebellion as Gaddafi quickly denounced the emerging opposition as terrorists and blamed outside influences for the rebellion. In truth, the protestors were looking to the fall of the Tunisian and Egyptian leaders through popular revolt as an inspiration while the security services cracked down. The use of force against protestors meant that some of the military and police defected to the opposition, which also included civilians and Islamists. Libyan cities, including Benghazi, fell to rebel forces and the government then launched a counterattack. The UN Security Council acted quickly, passing resolution 1973, which called for a ceasefire and authorised the implementation of a no-fly zone and the protection of civilians. This was mainly enforced by NATO and has been credited with tipping the balance in favour of the rebel National Transition Council (NTC), whom quickly took Tripoli and other government territory. Gaddafi was killed near the city of Sirte in October 2011. While clashes continued into 2012 the government had already been defeated when Tripoli fell in September 2011.

The descent into civil war in Libya was due to the influence of the Arab Spring and the government’s response to protests calling for democracy and accountability. This is in itself was not a unique situation as there had been regime change in Tunisia and Egypt as a result of protests against autocratic rule. In 2011 the state had appeared to be stable but had little legitimacy in the eyes of its people and the standard autocratic response of crushing dissent failed due to severity of the punishment meted out to protestors, who had initially been protesting for better conditions. Social media was not only a utility for organising protests, but also a means by which the response of the regime could be seen as a whole. This was enough for the rapid change from protest to rebellion when the use of repression, so effective before, failed. The defection of senior military figures to the rebellion was a development that would also occur in Syria where a similar pattern of crushing dissent and blaming ‘terrorists’ and outside influences failed to hide the fact that protests had escalated to rebellion due to the response of the government to calls for reform. Where Libya was unique was in the severity of the foreign intervention against the government and this can be put down to Gaddafi’s previous relationship with the West in particular. The normalisation of relations did not mean that previous events had been forgotten and when the government failed to implement the ceasefire required by UNSC Resolution 1973 the no-fly zone quickly became a de-facto provision of air support for the opposition forces. While this overstepped the resolution by a clear margin, marring relations between the permanent members of the UNSC, it also meant that the civil war was over in less than a year. It did not, however, guarantee the future success of a new Libyan government or prevent the gradual dissent into a second civil war.

Next week: Factional violence and a new civil war.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13755445

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/happening-libya-today-170418083223563.html

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator.

This week, the final part of the 2017 review looks at what 2018 holds for Syria and ISIS and global terrorism. As with the Rohingya Crisis and Ukraine, which were covered last week, these are brief overviews of what are complex situations extrapolating from the blogs throughout 2017 and making short term forecasts. Included below are links for more information on forecasts for armed conflict in 2018 to give wider perspective on the topics covered over the four weeks and introduce others that have been left out. Examples of the latter are the continuing North Korean crisis, the brutal war in Yemen, and Afghanistan. A guiding principle of the CARIS website is to provide information on armed conflict and its resolution and to point the reader elsewhere for more. This does not constitute a blanket recommendation or endorsement for third party material or a given view stated by them.

The Syrian War in 2018 will most likely be dominated by the Assad regime attempting to take the remainder of opposition held territory. This is a goal that it is capable of achieving provided that it continues to receive outside support but it is far from guaranteed. The current campaigns, which include Idlib (dominated by the Al-Qaeda linked HTS), Hama and Eastern Ghouta, indicate that the regime has little will to compromise with the remaining opposition forces. The consequences of this thus far have been well documented in Eastern Ghouta, an enclave that has resisted the government and its allies since the beginning of the war: a humanitarian crisis amid bombs. Should the regime be successful in its war goals then it will be a pyrrhic victory as it would effectively cripple the remaining moderate opposition and leave the government in possession of territories that will not be able to govern or move its forces through without risk of attack. The current situation is making a mockery of the de-escalation zones agreed at the Astana talks, which exist in name only. The reluctance of the opposition to attend Russian sponsored talks in Sochi is a consequence of this as any agreement made will constitute a negotiated surrender. Previous deals, also done under duress, which have allowed for population transfers have resulted in the movement of fighters and their families to Idlib province. This has had the dual outcome of eroding trust, as it puts the transferred population directly into another war zone, and of damaging the relationship between Turkey and Russia and Iran, as Turkey is a key opposition ally. Turkey has a presence in northern Syria and a further escalation of the fighting in both Idlib and Hama provinces may drive civilians northwards towards the Turkish border, potentially adding to the number of refugees Turkey is hosting. A further complication is the status of the Syrian Kurds, whose territorial gains in the Syrian War are a concern to Turkey and whose participation in the Sochi talks has been resisted by the opposition groups. Finally, we should note that the Syrian War is not simply about the incompatibilities between the government, a fractured opposition and the Kurds. It is also about the interests of regional and global actors who have a vested interest in the outcome of the war and these interests will continue to fuel the violence.

ISIS underwent a serious setback in 2017, effectively losing the caliphate and being knocked back in the majority of direct military confrontations. They are also struggling to maintain their social media presence as security services and the major media companies become more savvy at countering extremism online. They should not be treated as defeated, as regional affiliates continue to operate across world and the jihadist message still influences followers and new recruits. Without the core state the ISIS leadership are able to focus all their energies on the ‘near’ and ‘far’ abroad: for the ‘near’, read Egypt and Afghanistan as examples; for the ‘far’, read Europe, North America, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This focus will bring them into further rivalry with Al-Qaeda and its affiliates globally as they vie for dominance and with the Taliban in Afghanistan also. The conditions that enabled the rise of ISIS remain and the emergence of a new group should not be ruled out. The terrorism and insurgency underpinned by ideology of Salafi-Jihadism will continue to be a pervasive threat and the real question is as to whether it is a new group or one of Al-Qaeda or ISIS that becomes the primary driving force. Their fundamentalism guarantees that they will collide with government forces, whether these be secular dictatorships, democracies or otherwise.

This concludes the four-part review. During 2018 this blog will continue to cover the conflicts discussed above and return to the focus on Africa.

For more information regarding 2018 forecasts see:

https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2018

https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2017/12/30/new-in-2018-conflict-hot-spots-to-watch/

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/global-conflicts-to-watch-in-2018/547913/

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-defeat-syria-latest-iraq-2018-survive-a8107891.html

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/syria-peace-2018-180103110604320.html

The Africa series will continue throughout 2018.

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator.

Predicting the future trajectory of armed conflict is a notoriously difficult task, even when limited to a period of only one year. Events internal to a country are capable of producing unwelcome surprises: in the DRC we have witnessed the Kasai region plummet into horrendous violence that began over the matter of a local succession, at a time when attention was focused on the volatile east. The foreign policy of a global or regional power can also produce a major change: in Syria the Assad regime had been struggling until Iran and Russia intervened to ensure the regime’s survival. Nothing is ever certain, although short term forecasts extrapolating from ongoing crises are essential towards mitigating armed conflict and dealing with the consequences. This week we look at what 2018 holds for two areas covered in the weekly blog during the last year. These are the Rohingya Crisis and Ukraine. Next week we will look at Syria, ISIS and global terrorism. The conflict series on Africa will continue throughout the year.

The Rohingya Crisis has prompted international headlines but little concrete action to reign in the Myanmar army, which has driven hundreds of thousands of Rohingya into Bangladesh and displaced thousands more internally. There is little indication that the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya from Rakhine State in Myanmar will stop despite international condemnation of the security forces and government. Bangladesh and Myanmar have reached an agreement to repatriate the Rohingya back to Rakhine State. This would be a calamitous mistake that no organisation or government should back as there are no viable guarantees that can be made by the Myanmar government regarding their safety. The Rohingya have been repatriated twice before, only for the events of 2017 to take place. For now, the refugees will need to stay put in Bangladesh and other neighbouring countries less the international community become party to a genocide that many claim is already occurring. For this to happen requires the support of countries and organisations for UN led efforts to mitigate the impact on Bangladesh and put viable pressure on the Myanmar government to reform. Without either there is a risk of violence spreading into Bangladesh due to the pressure of the sheer number of refugees in an already tense political environment and potential for ARSA, a violent separatist groups whose attacks triggered the 2017 wave of violence, to escalate its campaign in Myanmar with support from international terrorist groups. Myanmar is supposed to be undergoing a transition from an authoritarian military state towards a democratic one but its actions in Rakhine State have exposed a dark side that has the potential to undermine the peace agreements it has made elsewhere.

Ukraine has remained deadlocked throughout 2017 and this is unlikely to change while the separatists of the east continue to be supported by Russia and Ukraine’s internal political problems remain unresolved. Of the conflicts covered in the weekly blog the Ukraine stands out as one that has the most potential for transformation yet remains intractable. The Minsk II agreement of 2015 has set the parameters by which a cessation of violence can be achieved but has resulted in only limited ceasefires that were then broken with mutual recrimination. A recent Russian proposal for peacekeepers, which would simply provide security for OSCE monitors, indicates a willing to compromise over a conflict that is damaging Russia over the long term and in an election year. The three critical prerequisites towards ending the violence and moving towards a constructive dialogue are the return of control of the Ukraine-Russia border to Ukraine, recognition by the government that the separatists in the east will have a degree of autonomy in a future Ukraine and the tackling of corruption within Ukrainian politics. These are the bare minimum that are required but the key factor is the removal of Russian support and influence in the east, a major step that will require guarantees from Ukraine that the Minsk II agreement will be applied, with associated guarantees from NATO and the EU that they will stay out of Ukraine while the country goes through a process of reconciliation and talks between the protagonists. The slim likelihood of this actually happening virtually guarantees the current stalemate will continue. Stopping the civil war and building a viable peace will be a great deal more difficult than exploiting the political differences between west and eastern Ukraine and triggering a conflict that has become intractable. As has been said before, Ukraine had problems long before the Kremlin decided to interfere so catastrophically in the affairs of a sovereign state, but the causes of the conflict are geo-political and armed conflict was avoidable. The reasons for the continuation of the conflict are different, as the separatists have made gains that they do not want to give up and the positions of the protagonists are entrenched through years of fighting. The peace process has stalled but it should not be abandoned as peace processes can take years of mediation and negotiation before a conflict reaches its end. The framework of a pathway out of the conflict is already in place, what is needed now is trust in order for it to be implemented. This can begin with small measures, including the prisoner exchanges that have already taken place, and build from there as a poor chance of peace in 2018 does not mean there is no chance or that it can’t be achieved in 2019.

The blogs concerning the above conflicts can be accessed at the CARIS website, which has links for Twitter and Facebook:

https://turnerconflict.com/

For the review of the Africa series see:

https://wordpress.com/post/turnerconflict.com/910

Next week: Part four of this review, with forecasts for Syria and ISIS and international terrorism.

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator.

Last week, in part one of the review of 2017, we reviewed Rohingya Crisis, conflict in Africa, and Ukraine. This week we will address Syria and ISIS and global terrorism, completing the five topics that this blog has covered. It should be stated again that armed conflict is not a state of affairs that affects the entirety of the world but instead can be considered more in terms of hotspots of violence, or ‘badlands’ in an otherwise increasingly peaceful world. The exception to the general rule is the distinct category of violence termed terrorism, a disputed and misused term, while the activity it refers to is better understood as the deliberate targeting of civilians for political reasons. The difference between terrorism and other types of armed violence is that it is not restricted to the badlands of violence, whether these be within a state or region, but has a more general reach in terms of where violence takes place.

There should also be a nod towards crises and conflicts that this blog was unable to cover or did not cover throughout the year. An example of the first was the increasing tension between North Korea and the United States, with the Korean leadership’s goal of developing nuclear weapons in the form of intercontinental ballistic missiles a major concern to South Korea, Japan and the US. The danger is not simply one of North Korea striking at a far enemy that it has seen as an enemy since the Korean War but also the resumption of a war between North and South Korea, who stopped fighting decades ago but never declared peace and with the additional possibility of Japan being sucked deeper into the crisis.  An example of the latter is the war in Yemen where the government and Houthi rebels are deadlocked and the Iranian backed Houthis are under constant air and ground attack from a Saudi-led coalition. The outcome of what many argue is a civil war made worse by being a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia is a catastrophic humanitarian crisis. As is the case with other conflicts appearing in the blog, the most devastating impact of armed conflict is not the casualties from battle between armed protagonists but the deaths and disease resulting from damage to infrastructure, medical facilities and lack of access to food.

Events in Syria during 2017 were dominated by the elimination of ISIS and the ascendancy of the Assad regime on the battlefield. ISIS fell due to competing advances by the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and its allies and the Kurdish dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which were backed by the airpower of Russia and the US-led coalition respectively. The Syrian War continued to be hideously complex. Turkey entered northern Syria as a result of its concerns over expanding Kurdish territory. Israel launched airstrikes at targets linked to Hezbollah and both Iran and Hezbollah retained a heavy presence in support of the Assad regime. A chemical attack by the regime in April on rebel held Khan Sheikhoun was immediately punished by a US cruise missile attack on a Syrian airfield, a rare instance of the US actually targeting the Syrian military. The US also provided ground troops in support of the SDF advance into Raqqa, which while liberated from ISIS bore the scars of years of bombing and the final ground assault. The composition of the Opposition continued to be varied, ranging along a spectrum with competing visions of a future Syria without Assad that included moderates, Islamists and jihadists, some of whom were fighting each other. One example is the protracted battle in Idlib province that has seen HTS, a jihadist group formerly linked to Al-Qaeda, emerge as the dominant faction. Syrian government forces have been active on multiple fronts, including Idlib in the north and the Damascus suburb of Eastern Ghouta. While the fighting has been intense there has been little concrete success from mediation and negotiation at Geneva and Astana, with de-escalation zones proving ineffective. Where there has been agreement it has been at the local level with opposition fighters and their families being moved to other opposition areas in Syria, notably Idlib. This effectively means moving from one siege to another with temporary respite from air attack, starvation and lack of medical supplies. As it stands, while Russia and Iran continue to support the Assad regime and the Opposition continues to reject a future Syria with Assad in power, the regime holds the upper hand.

The fortunes of ISIS were mixed. Its quasi-state straddling Syria and Iraq was comprehensively crushed as the major cities and territory it held were taken back. This was the culmination of campaigns that began in 2016 and also included the retaking of the city of Sirte in Libya. Further abroad, an ISIS linked group took the city of Marawi, which was quickly taken back. It would be a mistake to declare ISIS as done, the self-declared Islamic State was always vulnerable as it had pitted itself against all-comers and presented a clear target, but its strength lies in ideology and the recruitment of the disenfranchised as well as territory. Pockets of resistance remain in Iraq and Syria and there are franchises and associated groups in Libya, Egypt, Nigeria and Afghanistan, amongst others. 2017 has seen the defeat of the quasi-state that was Islamic State alongside an increase in its activities elsewhere. International terrorism linked to ISIS, in the form of shootings and bombings, struck at numerous places across Europe, Africa and Asia. These included Stockholm, St Petersburg, Tehran, Barcelona, Cambrils, Manchester and London. Many of these places had seen themselves as having avoided the type of attacks that had taken place previously in Berlin, Paris and Nice. Great Britain in particular had a bad year with multiple attacks and the Manchester Arena attack targeting a concert attended by children a low point. One commonality in these attacks was that they killed randomly, killing and injuring people of various nationalities. In the more conflict-prone areas of the world there were also attacks that stood out against the backdrop of persisting terrorist violence. In Baghdad a series of bombings deliberately targeted Shia Muslims breaking their Ramadan fasts, in Egypt an attack on worshippers at a Sufi mosque killed hundreds, as did a truck bomb in Somalia. The attacks at al-Rawda and Mogadishu have the ignoble achievement of ranking in the top ten of recorded terrorist attacks in terms of casualties. Not to be outdone the Taliban killed hundreds in an attack on Afghanistan’s diplomatic quarter.

The above is a summary only, with much left out. The Syrian War in particular is a multi-faceted one that has multiple incompatibilities and continues to resist mediation. ISIS is but one group amongst many with a jihadist or fundamentalist bent and it has dominated the headlines due to its existence as a quasi-state holding territory. Its demise does not mean the end of fundamentalism or the insurgency and terrorism linked to it. The question now is what to expect in 2018 as regards Syria, ISIS, the Rohingya, Ukraine and Africa.

The blogs concerning the above conflicts can be accessed at the CARIS website, which has links for Twitter and Facebook:

https://turnerconflict.com/

Next week: Part three of this review, with forecasts for 2018.

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator.

First, the good news: In general, as a global trend, the prevalence of armed conflict has been reducing consistently throughout the twenty-first century, with less deaths overall and a reduction of inter-state conflict. Data from the Global Peace Index demonstrates that this continued into 2016, and while we await reports for 2017, this trend is likely to continue and, at worst, there would be a slight increase.

It seems worse for two reasons. The first is that the media, by its nature, will lean towards reporting newsworthy events of interest to their viewers, usually of the bad variety. They are sometimes criticised for this, unfairly so, as good reporting, when it is impartial and informative, is crucial to revealing wrongdoing and providing a wider perspective for the viewer than what they experience themselves every day. The second is that where armed conflict is occurring it is unspeakably grim, and even in the regions usually neglected by the mainstream media due to its focus on Syria and ISIS, the prevalence of human rights violations and the impact of armed conflict has pushed local and regional conflicts to the fore. These can be seen as the ‘badlands’ in a world that is becoming more peaceful in the brute terms of violence and non-violence. It is these that this blog focuses on, with five, sometimes overlapping areas of interest dominating this year: Syria, ISIS and global terrorism, the Rohingya Crisis, conflict in Africa, and Ukraine.

The Rohingya crisis, in fact the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya, underwent a serious escalation in mid-2017, barely a year after a previous escalation. Both were linked to attacks in Myanmar by separatist groups claiming to represent the Rohingya but the outcome in both instances was that Myanmar’s army has systematically razed villages and towns to the ground and unleashed a campaign of sexual violence. This has contributed further to a refugee crisis that has seen the Rohingya forced from Rakhine State in Myanmar where tensions between the Muslim Rohingya and Buddhist Rakhine have a long history and have been ratcheted up by extremist monks with the acquiescence of the State. That there had been inter-communal violence by both sides is undeniable, but the persecution of the Rohingya by the state, which they describe as a ‘clearance operation’, has created a mass exodus to neighbouring Bangladesh. The governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh are edging towards an agreement that would see the Rohingya repatriated. Under current conditions this would be a mistake that could result in genocide. Some are arguing that this is already the case.

Understanding armed conflict in Africa is a stated aim of the website that generates this blog and thus far it has covered Somalia, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It should be stated that Africa is a massive continent with fifty-four countries and an unparalleled diversity of peoples and politics. The four countries covered represent only a fraction of these, while it is also the case that there are far more conflicts to understand. Forthcoming blogs will continue to focus on conflict on the African continent, beginning with Nigeria’s war against Boko Haram. The Africa series was reviewed in a recent blog and any general conclusions drawn relate to South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo only. Here, what appears to be violence with ethnic roots are arguably violence driven by politics, lack of representation and competition over resources, which are visibly manifested along ethnic lines. When the identification of people along ethnic lines becomes the dominant form of categorisation it is not long before violence becomes targeted against people on the basis of their ethnicity. The results are localised within each country, the ‘badlands’ referred to above, with dire humanitarian consequences, and with both violence at the national level between the state and rebels and numerous ‘micro-wars’ at the local level. The prevalence of major human rights violations is shockingly high, and it is highly probable that hidden amongst the overall picture of violence are a series of cases of ethnic cleansing at the micro level. There are no simple solutions to this, but at the top of the list is the provision of effective security at a time when UN budgets are under review and peacekeepers are becoming casualties. For a more comprehensive overview see the link provided below.

Finally, we turn to the war in Ukraine, which has lumbered on throughout the year with the occasional spike in violence punctuating what has been a grinding standoff along fixed lines and with daily casualties. Sadly, this has become a norm from which both sides need respite. That Ukraine’s trauma is a result of the Kremlin’s involvement is an allegation dismissed with merely a half-hearted denial and a knowing wink. It is unlikely that the separatists in the east could have maintained their war without Russian support, as was the case in earlier years when they were mounting offensives. This hides the internal problems in Ukraine that resulted in the Maidan protests and exacerbated the country’s division between a pro-EU/NATO west and Russian orientated east. It also allows for the Kremlin to exploit and reinforce discontent in the east as it challenges the dominance of the EU and NATO in Europe. Ukraine’s war rests on internal division and the geopolitical rivalry both: the former is a tragedy that besets many nations, the latter is a disgrace. The Ukraine is a casualty of a geopolitical standoff between the West (in the form of the EU and NATO) and Russia that was avoidable and is ultimately resolvable through rapprochement and dialogue. Removing this incompatibility from the Ukrainian conflict will not lead to an immediate resolution, but it will remove a major contributing factor.

The blogs concerning the above conflicts can be accessed at the CARIS website, which has links for Twitter and Facebook:

https://turnerconflict.com/

For the review of the Africa series see:

https://wordpress.com/post/turnerconflict.com/910

Next week: Part two of this review, including Syria, ISIS and global terrorism.

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

The recent lack of progress at the eighth intra-Syrian talks in Geneva surprised few as the participants arrived with predetermined outcomes in mind that have hobbled attempts at mediating the conflict between the Government and the Opposition since they began. The central incompatibility in the Syrian War over the future of the Assad regime, with the Opposition wanting a future Syria without it and the Government loathe to see Assad go, has defined the positions of the negotiating teams from the off. The only change has been a subtle one, from an Opposition High Negotiations Committee with a new leadership acknowledging the possibility that Assad would not need to go immediately. Any possibility of establishing a representative Syrian government free of sectarianism for all Syrians remains remote and the series of intra-Syrian talks continues to be a case of repeated mediation. Success, thus far, has been in getting the parties to the talks and agreeing what is being talked about, even if they remain in separate rooms. Nor have the de-escalation zones agreed at Astana, Kazakhstan’s capital, where Turkey, Iran, and Russia pushed through an agreement clearly forced upon the two parties, proved to be successful.

One such ‘de-escalation zone’ is Eastern Ghouta, where a strategy of siege and bombardment of the type employed in Aleppo has continued with little regard for civilians as the Government seeks to regain the territory dominated by a Saudi backed rebel group Jaysh al-Islam. Ghouta was also the location of the infamous chemical attacks in 2013 and has also been subjected to fighting between opposition groups and ISIS. The presence of groups at the fundamentalist end of the spectrum of opposition groups in Syria means that the Government is able to argue that the de-escalation agreements do not apply, as is the also case in Idlib province. Ghouta is of immense interest to the regime for one very important reason that also affects their willingness to negotiate: it is a Damascus district. The ruling parties in civil wars are loathe to negotiate when their cities are under threat and Ghouta has remained under rebel control since the beginning of the civil war and continued to be so as the number of actors involved in the war increased and it became an internationalised conflict. Regaining full control of the capital and its surrounding area remains a key priority for the regime.

There is another reason for the Government to continue its offensives, namely that it is winning and is likely to make gains on the battlefield as it seeks to achieve its central aim of regaining control of Syria. To reach this point it has needed support from Russia and Iran and despite the announcement by President Putin that some Russian forces will be withdrawn it is highly likely that this relates more to forthcoming elections in Russia than the situation in Syria. Both Russia and Iran favour a regime victory over the Opposition, and while this is a long way off the regime clearly has its sights on Eastern Ghouta and Idlib Province. The former has reached a critical point, where civilians are at risk of being starved or bombed out, and despite international calls for a ceasefire and cessation of bombing there is little likelihood of an outside intervention.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=58292#.WjgMRNSLSt8

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-42394259

https://theintercept.com/2017/12/17/syria-peace-talks-eastern-ghouta/

The next blog will be in the New Year.

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

The attack on the al-Rawda mosque on the 24^th November was an exercise in brutality so severe that its shockwave was felt globally against the backdrop of terrorist noise emanating from the Middle-East and North Africa. International condemnation was swift, as would be expected when 311 people are murdered and hundreds more injured in a place of prayer. It is an international norm that places of worship are treated as sacrosanct yet also a norm that they are attacked. The violence was also up close and personal: an estimated forty gunmen followed up the initial suicide bomb and went about their bloody business. While it should be the case that each and every life lost to violence counts the casualty count makes the attack at al-Rawda the seventh most deadly terrorist attack in recorded history. The only attack in 2017 more severe took place in Mogadishu when a truck bomb killed 512 people and injured 316. No claim of responsibility has been made so far for the al-Rawda attack but the finger of blame has been pointed firmly in the direction of the Sinai Province, ISIS’s Egyptian Wilayat. Egypt responded to the attack in characteristic fashion by launching airstrikes against suspected insurgent training camps.

The main reason for attribution of blame to Sinai Province is the target: a Sufi mosque. Sufi’s are seen as a legitimate target as Sufism is a mystical branch of Islam that seeks to get closer to God through the worship of saints and shrines. To the ultra-conservative Sunni’s of ISIS this amounts to apostasy as it is behaviour that is idolatrous, marking them out for attack alongside Egypt’s Coptic Christian’s who have also been targeted in large attacks twice in 2017. This is part of a trend, which can be reduced down to anyone who does not follow the Sunni faith, as the Yazidi’s and Shia’s of Iraq can testify, and the Sunni’s whom fail to measure up to the strict criteria set by ISIS or accept their rule when they take control of an area. If this smacks of totalitarianism then that is because it is fundamentally totalitarian in nature and is the reason why the self-declared Islamic State caliphate was so comprehensively condemned and crushed.

Sinai Province is not, however, the root cause of the turmoil besetting the Sinai region or Egypt in general but is instead a symptom of a wider problem. Islamist movements, notably the Muslim Brotherhood, have been present throughout modern Egypt’s history and the state has cracked down severely on both political and insurgent activity. In 2012, after the deposing of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, it was a Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Mohammed Morsi, who won the Presidential elections. He was removed from power by the Army after a brutal crackdown on protestors and the Muslim Brotherhood was banned. While the Brotherhood went through a period of violent uprising in its history it had also been comprehensively crushed and by the time of the Arab Spring was a distinctly political Islamist party. Its banning had the effect of crippling Islamist political representation in Egypt. Violent extremism is nothing new in Egypt, but the rise of a new group, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, in the Sinai took place in 2011 during Egypt’s political turmoil and its operations increased in 2013 after the Army coup, with a shift to the targeting of the Egyptian military. In 2014 it sought support from ISIS and became the Egyptian Wilayat for ISIS. While Ansar Bait al-Maqdis emerged from other Salafi-Jihadist groups in the Sinai and had a strong Bedouin component, the current incarnation as Sinai Province includes foreign fighters. In effect, regional discontent towards the government has allowed the entry of ISIS into the Sinai as a major force and has turned the Sinai Peninsula into a frontline battleground between the Egyptian military and ISIS. The turmoil has become so pronounced that tribes within the region are considering taking the fight to ISIS themselves. Despite two major military campaigns the militants are still able to mount attacks such as that at al-Rawda.

For the present and in the near future we can expect an escalation by the Egyptian military with help from outside powers to defeat the extremism in Sinai and the rest of Egypt. For an idea of what this may look like then think of Marawi, Ramadi and Sirte, which are examples of other cases where heavy handed governance has provoked an insurgency that is then seized on by the jihadists. The Sinai Province group will go the way of ISIS but, as is the case in Libya, Syria, and Iraq, defeating the extremists is one thing while setting the conditions for sustainable peace and preventing another group rising to the fore is another. It is also part of a wider trend in the Middle-East and North Africa. While there is clearly a dearth of effective political representation across the region and the legitimacy of the state is constantly under challenge, there is little doubt as to what the extremists who have hijacked the political situation bring to the table: outright terror. Terrorism is a contested term. The murder of 311 people in a mosque is a glaring example of what it actually looks like.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

https://www.vox.com/2017/11/28/16704438/egypt-mosque-terror-attack-sufism-isis

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-w-kearn/back-to-future-egypts-bat_b_3806379.html

http://www.newsweek.com/why-are-muslims-killing-muslims-egypt-worst-terror-attack-history-721381

https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/egypt

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator

As the termination of ISIS continues to be undertaken in both Syria and Iraq the questions over who is to hold what territory now that they have been conclusively eliminated as a quasi-state peace in Syria still remain to be answered. While there have been some clear winners in Syria these do not include the beleaguered populations in the remaining Opposition held territories. The US has achieved its goal of defeating ISIS on the ground, one which its shared with every other actor in the Syrian War, the Kurd’s have established themselves in the north, and the Syrian Government and its Russian and Iranian allies have effectively secured the future of the Assad regime in the short term. There are also two other organisations that have seen recent successes: Al Qaeda and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Many would argue, convincingly, that these are one and the same, while few would deny that they are cut from the same jihadist cloth. The Opposition as a whole remains diverse, ranging along a spectrum of moderates, Islamists and jihadists, and the latter have consistently targeted the rest as they seek to achieve dominance in Idlib Province and southern Syria.

Despite the nominal existence of de-escalation zones brokered by Russia, Iran and Turkey in Astana fighting continues in Idlib, the Damascus suburb of Ghouta, and Syria’s south. The primary means by which resistance is being broken down is through airstrikes and it is increasingly likely that Ghouta will fall in the bloody manner that befell Aleppo the previous year. There is little doubt that the government has the upper hand and while Russia is indicating that it may withdraw some of its forces Iran is consolidating its position in Syria alongside its continuing influence in Iraq. In the north, Turkey has launched its own operations to secure its border area with Syria and is pursuing its own distinct course. Even in the event of an unlikely cessation of hostilities by the Opposition moderates and Islamists (which would actually be a negotiated surrender) the jihadists would remain and the unresolved questions over who would control what territory would also remain. Turkey continues to oppose Kurdish dominance in northern Syria, Raqqa’s future governance remains to be agreed, Israel wants both Iran and Hezbollah away from its borders, and any future major operation by the Syrian Arab Army to take Idlib province from HTS has the potential to be a catastrophe. This is not a complete picture but merely examples from many. Put succinctly, there are far too many interests and rivalries at the local, national, regional and global levels to allow for a comprehensive solution to the Syrian War in the immediate future.

The current hope for an Opposition-Government rapprochement is the eighth round of UN sponsored talks at Geneva, which have been extended to the 12^th of December. This is part of a UN led Syrian peace process that has seen little concrete results aside from actually getting the protagonists to the same talks. Russia has suspended its own conference at Sochi while the talks continue. The parallel talks at Astana have produced the de-escalation zones in the past, but these were more along the lines of an enforced agreement as opposed to a negotiated one. The US recognises the Geneva talks only, with those at Astana being dominated by Russia, Iran, and Turkey. This does not mean that the US and Russia don’t cooperate on the fringes of the talks, as they generally meet in the background and both have an interest in resolving the Syrian War. The trouble, of course, is that they each want it to be on their own terms and differ over such matters as Kurdish involvement and the future status of Assad. The latter has consistently proved to be a sticking point at Geneva, with each side having their own preconceived and incompatible ideas regarding Assad and refusing to budge. The most likely outcome from Geneva VIII is that nothing substantial will be agreed, particularly as one side (the regime) holds the upper hand and has no reason to change its position when it believes it can win. The only thing that will break the deadlock is an acceptance by the newly reformed Opposition negotiators that Assad remains in the short to medium term. In the long term, the Assad regime is unsustainable and any future Syrian government will be a result of negotiation, compromise, and conciliation. This is the case in all civil wars where the intention is to keep the country intact and it takes a long time to get there with key requirements being that the violence stops and the guilty from all sides are held accountable. The Syrian War will reach this point but it will require the regional and global powers whom have helped fuel the War to cooperate towards achieving a state of nonviolence. The question is as to when. Each round of mediation and negotiation is a step closer to this, and the focus will move to Sochi, then Astana, and back to Geneva and also include the generally unsung mediation and negotiation at the local, national and regional levels.

This is, however, of little consolation to victims of the Syrian War and the people of Syria who deserve better.

Next week: Egypt’s turmoil in the Sinai.

For more information regarding this week’s blog see:

http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-clearing-path-dominance-southern-syria

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/28/syrian-government-to-join-un-peace-talks-in-geneva

https://www.rferl.org/a/syria-un-government-hasnt-confirmed-attend-geneva-peace-talks/28882668.html

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-civil-war-east-ghouta-damascus-bashar-al-assad-siege-tactics-starvation-bombing-a8075666.htm

Dr Carl Turner, Site Coordinator